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Abstract 
Several theoretical accounts postulate an influence of mood on response inhibition, a central 
component of executive function (EF) that refers to withholding pre-potent responses that are 
inappropriate within a particular goal-context. The first of these accounts, cognitive load theory, 
assumes that all emotional arousal (positive or negative) places demands on EF via task-
unrelated thoughts and thus increased emotional experience is more likely to decrease EF 
performance. The mood-as-information theory suggests that negative mood indicates threat and 
promotes an analytic thinking style which will improve EF skills, such as response inhibition, 
that should benefit from a more analytic approach to information processing, whereas positive 
mood stimulates a heuristic thinking style which will have the converse effect. Finally, 
motivational accounts suggest that emotional valence (positive vs. negative) is less important 
than the underlying motivational system that is engaged through the emotional experience. 
Herein, it is predicted that response inhibition will be bolstered by approach motivation (e.g., 
anger, curiosity) but hindered by avoidance motivated experiences (e.g., anxiety). Given 
inconsistent research findings in the literature regarding the interplay of mood and response 
inhibition, my master’s research examined emotional reactivity as a potential moderator of this 
relationship. Emotional reactivity is stable trait that denotes the typical rapidity, intensity, and 
duration of an emotional response. It was predicted that individuals who experience stronger, 
more frequent, and longer-lasting negative emotions (i.e., those higher in reactivity) would be 
more accustomed to the experience of a negative mood and thus able to utilize an analytic 
thinking style to enhance their inhibitory performance without experiencing an associated 
increase in cognitive load – whereas the opposite would occur for those lower in reactivity 
(leading to a decrement in inhibitory performance). The interaction of emotional reactivity and 
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negative affect emerged as a significant predictor of response inhibition in the way that was 
hypothesized. The current dissertation aimed to replicate and extend these findings. Study 1 was 
conceptually similar to my master’s research but used an experimental design to induce negative 
and positive mood states (vs. exploring naturally occurring fluctuations in mood). Similar to 
results from my master’s research, participants lower in reactivity performed more poorly on a 
task of response inhibition with increasing levels of negative mood while those higher in 
reactivity demonstrated the opposite trend. Additionally, individuals lower in reactivity 
performed more poorly in the negative mood condition than in the positive mood condition while 
those higher in reactivity performed comparably across conditions. These findings further 
support emotional reactivity as a moderator of the mood-inhibition relationship and are 
consistent with the suggestion that negative mood may promote an analytic thinking style that 
can be utilized by individuals who are accustomed to unpleasant emotional experiences (i.e., 
high reactive individuals) but engenders greater cognitive load for those who are not (i.e., low 
reactive individuals). The affective certainty model, which predicts interference in EF tasks when 
moods are trait-inconsistent emerged as a model that shared consistency with these results and 
was compatible with both the mood-as-information and cognitive load theories. Predictions 
stemming from mood-as-information theory were more directly assessed in Study 2, which 
manipulated thinking style (analytic vs. heuristic) through a Navon-like induction. In the 
heuristic condition, based on the finding that people are generally in a positive mood state and 
that consequently they tend to employ a heuristic thinking style it was predicted that there would 
be a replication of the interaction from my master’s research where negative affect would instill 
cognitive load for low but not high reactive individuals. Consistent with this prediction, as well 
as findings from Study 1 and my master’s work, increasing negative affect was associated with 
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better inhibitory performance for individuals higher in reactivity while those lower in reactivity 
demonstrated the opposite trend. In the analytic condition, it was predicted that focusing on local 
information would engender an analytic thinking style which would be enhanced by negative 
affect and override cognitive load instilled by this affective state. Consistent with this prediction, 
participants’ performance improved with increasing levels of negative affect regardless of 
emotional reactivity. In neither condition, however, was there compelling evidence that the 
pattern of results could be attributed to the manipulation of thinking style. Finally, Study 3 tested 
predictions following from motivational accounts of affective influences on EF by inducing 
emotions (anger, anxiety and boredom) that tap into differing motivational systems (approach vs. 
avoidance). Contrary to my hypothesis, response inhibition was comparable across conditions. 
However, when negative arousal was considered in the model, the anxiety and anger conditions 
diverged such that as negative affect increased in the anxiety condition performance worsened. 
Conversely, as negative affect increased in the anger condition performance improved. 
Emotional reactivity was not predictive of performance across conditions. Findings across 
studies in my doctoral work find consistent support for the affective certainty and cognitive load 
hypotheses. Study 2 provided partial support for the mood-as-information theory while Study 3 
found partial support for the motivational accounts of the EF-mood relationship. Overall, results 
help to explain inconsistent research findings with the inclusion of an individual differences 
factor, emotional reactivity, which emerged as a powerful moderator that makes divergent 
predictions about the effects of affect on response inhibition based on what is affectively normal 
at an individual level.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Affect 
Affect has been defined as a “neurophysiological state consciously accessible as the 
simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). 
Mood and emotions both emerge from this common affective basis; however, moods typically 
involve complex amalgamations of affective experience which are less intense, longer lasting, 
and lack a well-defined object of reference when compared with emotions (Larsen, 2000; Russell 
& Barret, 1999). 
A four-factor circumplex model of affect was originally postulated by Russell (1980) and 
included factors of pleasure, excitement, arousal and contentment. This model postulates that 
both negative and positive affective states vary in their degree of physiological arousal and 
satisfaction. The factors in this model thus reflect combinations of arousal and pleasure, which 
are not explicitly teased apart. In subsequent work, Russell and colleagues (Russell, 2003; 
Russell & Barret, 1999) proposed a model of core affect that includes two bipolar factors of 
activation (arousal) and pleasure (valence) as well as one vertical dimension that differentiates 
amongst prototypical emotional episodes (e.g., fear vs. terror). In this model, core affect 
represents an ever-present dynamic system of emotional experience that is conceptually similar 
to notions of mood when considered on a longer time-course and supplies individuals with 
emotional information that may engage different motivational systems that guide goal-oriented 
behaviour (i.e., avoidance vs. engagement with a stimulus). 
Fight or flight are fundamental examples of approach and avoidance behaviours, 
respectively. Herein, affect is essential in rapid prediction of our environment and engagement in 
subsequent adaptive behaviour (Barrett & Bar, 2009). As an example, a form that resembles a 
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predator stimulates high arousal, negative valence and avoidance motivation which indicates 
threat and would likely lead to a flight or freeze response. The repeated pairing of a prediction 
(e.g., threat from predatory features) with a response (e.g., flight) strengthens the association 
between the two to create mental shortcuts or heuristics for dealing with various situations. Once 
the response to the stimulus becomes pre-potent, it requires either a natural extinction of this 
response (i.e., repetitive exposure to that stimulus without the predicted response) or a more 
effortful interference of that process via executive function to break it down (Delgado et al., 
2008). 
Executive Function 
Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term for inter-related skills that are used to self-
regulate one’s thoughts and behaviours to attain goals (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). Several 
conceptualizations of EF have been put forth varying in the number, nature, and organization of 
skills that are identified (Goldstein et al., 2014). One widely accepted model is the unity and 
diversity framework initially proposed by Miyake and colleagues in 2000 and refined in 2012 
(Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). In this model, EF is conceptualized as 
hierarchically organized skills in which lower levels support increasingly complex, higher-order 
behaviours. The most foundational skill is response inhibition (also referred to as ‘common EF’), 
which entails withholding responses that are pre-potent yet inappropriate within a particular 
goal-context. Response inhibition as a skill is marked by a balance between speed in responding 
when it is needed and accuracy in inhibiting a response when appropriate. Not responding when 
it is required and responding when it is inappropriate can both be detrimental in quickly adapting 
to novel situations. Evidence for the primacy of response inhibition vis-à-vis other executive 
skills comes from latent modeling of adult task performance (Miyake et al., 2012) and 
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developmental research identifying it as the first executive skill to emerge and fully mature (Bell 
& Fox, 1992; Huizinga et al., 2006). Inhibition, in turn, supports two executive skills that are 
also viewed as core components of EF: working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), which 
actively monitors, represents, and updates goal-relevant information, and switching (Monsell, 
2003), which involves flexibly shifting attention between tasks or mental sets for the purpose of 
goal attainment. Response inhibition, working memory, and shifting promote other executive 
skills, like planning, organization, self-monitoring, and emotion regulation – all of which are 
necessary for behaving adaptively in the real-world (Harms et al., 2014; Koechlin, 2016; 
Pugliese et al., 2015).  
An important function served by response inhibition is that it allows for a recalibration of 
heuristics created through punishment or reward reinforcement when a heuristic is inappropriate 
given the goal-context. Alternatives to these heuristics may be considered via working memory 
and alternate behaviours that are more adaptive or rewarding can be implemented via switching. 
In other words, response inhibition is the aspect of EF that signifies conflict between our 
prediction system and behaviour that would be more situationally appropriate. Thus, while 
reward and punishment reinforcement via affective systems creates predictive shortcuts, 
response inhibition involves withholding shortcuts that are inappropriate given the situation. 
Executive Function and Affect 
Accordingly, we can see how response inhibition and affect might interact to predict 
adaptive behaviour. Affective systems can be extremely helpful in allowing for quick and 
efficient processing of information which requires little effort. For example, putting one foot in 
front of the other on a well-known trail helps move us forward without bombarding us with 
uncertainty about our next step. If, however, our environment is more uncertain (e.g., novel, 
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dangerous) we may need to inhibit this heuristic response to minimize the potential for harm 
(Pessoa, 2009). This would call for an inhibition of this heuristic and adoption of a more cautious 
or analytic approach which is beneficial in the sense that it will aid in reducing harm when it is 
situationally adaptive to do so. Utilizing the same example, looking at where your foot is going 
to be placed before putting it down or planning your next couple of steps before taking them on a 
difficult part of the trail. Through this example, we can see that the interaction of affective 
(heuristic) and response inhibitory (analytic) processes are helpful for effectively approaching an 
ever-changing environment. Theoretical perspectives regarding the interplay of affect and EF are 
summarized below.   
Cognitive Load Theory 
         Cognitive load theory suggests that both positive and negative affect engage working 
memory (e.g., through emotion regulation), which limits available resources that could be 
utilized for EF tasks. In other words, any kind of affective experience increases the likelihood 
that there will be a decrement in the application of executive skills. A review conducted by 
Mitchell and Phillips (2007) noted that little work had examined the interplay of EF and negative 
affect at that time. However, their review identified instances in which positive moods had 
varying affects on EF depending on the executive skill under consideration (e.g., generally 
positive for creativity, negative for working memory, and mixed for response inhibition). Based 
on available evidence regarding the association of positive affect and EF, Mitchell and Phillips 
(2007) concluded that there was insufficient empirical support for cognitive load theory. 
Although not directly related to EF, Seibert and Ellis (1991) found that task-irrelevant thoughts 
on a memory recall task were significantly higher in positive and negative mood induction 
conditions than in a neutral mood condition. Memory recall was also significantly better in the 
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neutral condition than in the positive or negative mood conditions. Finally, they found that the 
negative relationship between task-irrelevant thoughts and recall performance was linear across 
all three mood conditions. Taken together, these findings suggest that cognitive load is likely 
imposed through mediating mechanisms, such as task-irrelevant thoughts, that are amplified 
through positive and negative arousal. More recent research by Curci and colleagues (2013) has 
tested this hypothesis of cognitive load instilled through rumination by examining performance 
on a task of working memory in negative and neutral mood conditions. Working memory 
performance at post-test was lower and ruminative thoughts were higher in the negative mood 
condition. Moreover, rumination fully mediated the relationship between negative emotional 
experience and working memory performance across conditions. As such, it is thought that 
cognitive load is imposed by affect through a mediating mechanism such as task-irrelevant 
thoughts or rumination which likely increases with the level of emotional arousal experienced. 
Therefore, it is thought that positive and negative affect will only instill cognitive load through 
these mediating mechanisms, but it also stands to reason that at extreme levels of arousal (e.g., 
terror, elation) both positive and negative affect would interfere with EF. Given that the studies 
within this dissertation look at natural variations in mood and induced affective states within a 
lab-setting, we anticipate that cognitive load will only be incurred through task-irrelevant 
thoughts activated via mood. 
Mood-as-Information Theory  
In contrast to cognitive load theory, mood-as-information theory suggests that affect has 
the potential to help or hinder EF pending the nature of both the affective state and executive 
skill (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). According to this perspective, negative mood indicates the 
presence of threat and shifts individuals to a more analytic processing style whereas positive 
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mood signifies the absence of threat and induces individuals to a more heuristic processing style. 
Considerable work has demonstrated that moods influence information processing in the manner 
suggested by mood-as-information theory. For example, Park and Banaji (2000) demonstrated 
that individuals in negative mood states were more analytic and individuals in positive moods 
were more heuristic in how they processed information. Consistent results were reported by 
Gasper and Clore (2002), who found that participants in a negative mood condition exhibited a 
strong bias towards processing information analytically. They also found that their neutral mood 
condition resulted in high positive mood, which led to a heuristic bias towards processing 
information. This latter finding is consistent with the suggestion that when mood is not actively 
manipulated, individuals tend to experience more positive than negative affect overall and a 
tendency for information to be processed more heuristically (Diener & Diener, 1996; Xu et al., 
2019). Further support for this view comes from the seminal work of David Navon (1977). 
Although he did not manipulate mood, his research established that individuals naturally 
demonstrate a heuristic information processing bias when presented with stimuli that are 
incongruent at the global and local levels (e.g., a large ‘n’ made up of smaller ‘b’s’).1 This makes 
intuitive sense, considering that it would be resource intensive to analyze an object's component 
parts to deduce what it is. Simply put, it is easier to represent one forest than 100,000 trees.  
Similar to mood-as-information theory, Fredrickson’s (2001) broaden-and-build 
hypothesis suggests that positive mood leads to an expansion of cognitive scope because it 
denotes the absence of threat and promotes more heuristic processing (i.e., less of a need to be 
cautious) whereas negative mood indicates the presence of threat and leads to a more analytic 
thinking style that actively scans the environment for risks (i.e., more of a need to be cautious). 
 
1 Throughout this dissertation heuristic processing will be equated to identifying information at a global level while 
analytic processing will be synonymous to local level processing. 
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Although these theoretical perspectives share some conceptual overlap, mood-as-information 
theory views negative mood as infrequent and uncomfortable – requiring some form of active 
regulation to return to a state of comfort (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003). Consistent with 
cognitive load theory, Schwarz and Clore (2003) expected that since negative moods are 
infrequent for most, they would need to explain or regulate them which would lead to 
interference in analytic thinking via emotion regulation (e.g., cognitive reappraisal). However, 
negative mood was associated with analytic thinking in several experiments (Mackie et al., 1992; 
Park & Banaji, 2000; Schwarz et al., 1991). While these studies draw a connection between 
analytic processing and negative affect, it is unknown whether active emotion regulation 
interferes with this analytic processing during EF tasks.  
Affective Certainty Theory 
Research by Tamir and colleagues (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002) has 
suggested incorporating individual differences in state and trait affect into the mood-as-
information theory. Trait affect refers to an individual’s general experience of affect and tends to 
be more stable over time (e.g., neuroticism). Conversely, state affect is a transient experience of 
affect (e.g., anxiety) expressed in a given situation (Tamir & Robinson, 2004). Their affective 
certainty model found that personality traits such as extraversion and neuroticism, which are 
related to increased trait positive and negative affect respectively, were associated with improved 
performance on sorting tasks when state and trait affect were consistent. Tamir et al. (2002) 
demonstrated that extraverts perform better on a decision-making task when in a positive mood 
while introverts perform better when in a negative mood. Similarly, Tamir and Robinson (2004) 
found that individuals high in neuroticism performed better on a categorization task when in a 
negative mood while those low in neuroticism performed worse. The affective certainty model 
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proposes that trait-consistent mood states are indicative of predictability in our environment and 
lead to effective functioning within it (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002).  
Although the affective certainty model helps to explain the pattern of results observed in 
these two studies, the mechanism explaining this pattern of results remains unspecified. It is 
plausible that affective uncertainty may motivate individuals to regulate trait-inconsistent 
emotions, similar to what was posited by Schwarz and Clore (2003), which may introduce 
cognitive load in the form of task-irrelevant thoughts that could involve rumination to up-
regulate negative emotions or cognitive reappraisal to down-regulate negative emotions. Thus, 
although it might be intuitive to think that all individuals want to be in a more pleasant mood 
state, negative mood states that are trait-consistent provide predictability and comfort and might 
motivate individuals to maintain a negative mood. This motivational theory of emotion 
regulation has also been supported through research by Tamir and colleagues (Tamir, 2005; 
Tamir et al., 2017; Tamir et al., 2020). 
Motivational and Arousal Accounts 
         Mitchell and Phillips’ (2007) final hypothesis is based upon Isen’s (1999) work which 
states that mild positive mood states will facilitate performance on tasks of creativity and will 
have no effect on tasks that require systematic processing such as tasks of response inhibition or 
working memory. The idea that specifically mild positive mood states are beneficial for EF tasks 
that require broadened cognitive scope, suggests a special role for mood-related arousal on task 
performance. Arousal, or activation, is featured in prominent models of affect (e.g., Russell, 
2003). It is possible that differences in level of emotional arousal may be ideal for certain 
executive skills, with too much or too little causing interference. Indeed, research has supported 
this claim with both high negative and positive arousal leading to decreases in response 
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inhibitory performance (Verbruggen & de Houwer, 2007). This effect has been supported 
through research by Pessoa and colleagues (Pessoa et al., 2012) especially with regards to high 
arousal negative affect.  
Other more recent work has further explored different discrete emotional states and how 
their underlying differences in motivational systems interact with attention (Corr, 2004; Gable et 
al., 2015; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones et al., 2011; Gasper & Zawadzki, 2013; Shields et 
al., 2016). Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST; Gray, 1970; Gray & McNaughton, 2000) 
identifies three motivational systems of emotion: the behavioural activation system (BAS), 
behavioural inhibition system (BIS) and the fight/flight/freeze system (FFFS). The FFFS refers 
to high arousal emotional states such as fear or panic which result in a fight, flight or freeze 
response in pursuit of avoidance of aversive stimuli (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The BAS is 
hypothesized to be related to emotions that provide positive and negative reinforcement and are 
associated with rewarding stimuli (Gray, 1970). This system embodies approach motivation and 
primarily includes positive emotions but has also been related to negative emotions such as anger 
(Harmon-Jones, 2003). Conversely, the BIS is hypothesized to be related to resolving goal 
conflict (e.g., approaching threat in pursuit of a goal) and is primarily associated with the 
experience of anxiety. Activation of this system engages problem solving and risk assessment 
which can increase the likelihood of experiencing worry and rumination (Corr, 2004). 
Interestingly, unlike the aforementioned theoretical accounts, the RST suggests that two 
negatively valenced emotions, anger and anxiety, might influence attentional processes in 
divergent ways through activation of the BAS and BIS respectively. It is therefore possible that a 
more nuanced understanding of how affective experiences influence response inhibition may be 
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obtained by considering the interplay of motivational systems that are triggered by affective 
states. 
Indeed, recent research has demonstrated that anger facilitates, whereas anxiety hinders, 
EF performance (Shields et al., 2016). Furthermore, research by Roskes and colleagues (Roskes 
et al., 2013) suggests that avoidance motivated arousal (i.e., BIS/FFFS) is more cognitively and 
physiologically demanding than approach motivated arousal (i.e., BAS) which may lend some 
credence to the cognitive load hypothesis for avoidance motivated emotional states. In contrast, 
approach-oriented states may provide an analytic thinking style whilst also promoting 
engagement with a task that is not impaired through cognitive load. Herein, it is important to 
note that the study by Gable and colleagues (Gable et al., 2015) found that positive emotions 
high in engagement (e.g., curious) also promoted a more analytic focus through engagement with 
a particular stimulus. Conversely, low arousal negative states such as sadness have also been 
shown to broaden cognitive scope (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b). Consistent with this, 
research by Isen (1999) and Fredrickson (2001) supports the idea that low arousal positive mood 
states broaden cognitive scope as well. 
Taken together, research examining motivational and arousal systems adds to mood-as-
information theory by suggesting these components of emotional information lead to differences 
in cognitive scope that will focus an individuals attention on avoidance or approach depending 
on the discrete emotional state. It is suggested that approach motivation will be beneficial to 
response inhibition, although there is only one known study that has looked at motivation and EF 
specifically (Shields et al., 2016). Moreover, no known research has supported mood-as-
information theory and a connection with response inhibition. There has been some support in 
the literature that trait-inconsistent emotions may instill cognitive load through affective 
 
11 
   
uncertainty (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002) or emotion regulation (e.g., 
rumination; Curci et al., 2013) but clear support for any of the aforementioned theories has not 
been observed. The studies presented in this dissertation aim to test these theoretical models by 
looking at individual differences in the experience of affect.  
Individual Differences in Affective Experience: Emotional Reactivity 
Affect and response inhibition have not consistently demonstrated a clear relationship in 
the literature, which is perhaps due to the simplification of affect to a single dimension (valence) 
without consideration of other dimensions (motivation and information processing); however, 
another potentially relevant factor that has been often overlooked is individual differences in the 
experience of affect. As mentioned, research by Tamir and colleagues (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; 
Tamir et al., 2002) has looked at personality components such as neuroticism and extraversion 
and discovered interactive effects on tasks of decision making where trait-consistent moods led 
to increases in performance. An individual differences factor similar to neuroticism is emotional 
reactivity. Emotional reactivity and neuroticism are similar in that they are related to increased 
negative affect but divergent in that emotional reactivity is not related to positive affect while 
neuroticism is associated with decreased positive affect (Nock et al., 2008; Thake & Zelenski, 
2013). This is an important conceptual difference as it assumes that negative affect is trait-
consistent for those higher in emotional reactivity and trait-inconsistent for those lower in 
emotional reactivity but does not specify that positive affect would be trait inconsistent based on 
emotional reactivity. Data from an unpublished manuscript by Gabel and McNeil (in 
preparation) supports that emotional reactivity and neuroticism are separate but related 
constructs with a correlation of about .65. 
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Emotional reactivity is a primary individual differences factor that is related to both 
arousal and valence of emotional experience. Emotional reactivity is defined as a stable 
individual differences trait that reflects the rapidity, intensity, and duration of negative affective 
and arousal responses (Howland et al., 2017; Nock et al., 2008). Individual differences in 
emotional reactivity are evident in the first year of life, such that infants will respond differently 
to the same stimulus based on how reactive they are – a finding that persists into the adult years 
(Diener et al., 1985; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007; Silvers et al., 2012). Across 
development, emotional reactivity has been linked to factors that increase risk for 
psychopathology, including neuroticism, negative mood, maladaptive regulation of mood, and 
insecure attachment (Thake & Zelenski, 2013; Wei et al., 2005). It is important to note that 
although emotional reactivity has been related to increased risk for psychopathology, it is 
examined within this dissertation within an undergraduate population and results might not 
generalize to a clinical population. 
         My Masters research looked into emotional reactivity as a moderator of the association 
between naturally occurring variations in mood and performance on tasks of response inhibition 
and working memory (Gabel & McAuley, 2018). Emotional reactivity and positive and negative 
affect were measured via self-report while response inhibition and working memory were 
measured with cognitive tasks. These tasks included letter-number sequencing, operation span 
and reading span for working memory and the flanker, spatial compatibility and stop signal tasks 
for response inhibition. Working memory and response inhibition tasks were formed into a 
structural model and modelled as latent constructs of working memory and inhibition. Consistent 
with previous research, mood was largely positive with approximately 75% of individuals 
experiencing more positive than negative emotion. Herein, we found that increasing emotional 
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reactivity was significantly correlated with higher levels of negative (but not positive) affect in 
our sample. We also found that emotional reactivity moderated the association between negative 
affect and latent variables of response inhibition and working memory performance, such that 
individuals higher in reactivity performed better as levels of negative affect increased whereas 
individuals lower in reactivity showed the converse pattern. This pattern is consistent with the 
affective certainty model (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002) such that individuals 
higher in reactivity may have performed better than individuals lower in reactivity with 
increasing levels of negative affect because for them these mood states are affectively ‘normal’. 
For individuals lower in reactivity, these states are novel or trait-inconsistent and require extra 
processing (e.g., emotion regulation) similar to what would be predicted by the affective 
certainty, cognitive load and mood-as-information hypotheses (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). In the 
context of our study, an implication of the foregoing is that negative mood may have placed 
lesser cognitive demands as reactivity increased and thus higher reactive individuals might be 
better able to utilize negative arousal to engage in an analytic thinking style to perform the task 
at hand. Importantly, despite experiencing more frequent and long-lasting negative moods, high 
reactive individuals do not differ in their experience of positive mood and it may be that negative 
arousal experienced during both negative and positive moods is not trait-inconsistent to the point 
of interfering with response inhibitory or working memory tasks. 
 The current thesis aims to expand upon this work utilizing emotional reactivity as a 
moderator of affect in examining the relationship between affect and response inhibition. The 
following studies expand upon my Masters research to include active manipulation of mood 
states (i.e., positive and negative) and bridge gaps in the literature by directly examining 
information processing styles (i.e., analytic and heuristic) as well as motivational factors (i.e., 
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approach and avoidance). Chapter 2 explores the relationship between response inhibition and 
positive and negative valence through an active manipulation of these mood states while 
examining how emotional reactivity affects this relationship. Chapter 3 builds upon this by 
assessing how heuristic and analytic information processing styles affect response inhibition 
while controlling for natural variations in positive and negative affect and utilizing emotional 
reactivity as a moderator. Finally, Chapter 4 considers how variation in the underlying 
motivational systems of anger (high arousal approach-motivated), anxiety (high arousal 
avoidance-motivated) and boredom (low arousal approach-motivated) predict response inhibition 
while controlling for individual differences in emotional valence and emotional reactivity. These 
chapters contribute to the literature relating response inhibition to affect by integrating broader 
theoretical perspectives which include information processing and motivational systems 
engendered by divergent emotional states while incorporating an understanding of individual 
differences in emotional reactivity. Results in the following chapters generally support a more 
nuanced relationship between affect and response inhibition which suggests that as emotional 
reactivity increases, negative affect leads to less interference during the Stop Signal task which is 
in line with the affective certainty model. The aforementioned relationship of emotional 
reactivity, negative affect and response inhibition changes when information processing is 
induced to be more analytical, in line with the mood-as-information theory, or underlying 
motivation is approach oriented (e.g., anger) such that all individuals seem to benefit from 
negative affect under these circumstances. The final chapter provides a more detailed summary 




   
Chapter 2: Emotional reactivity moderates the association between negative mood and 
response inhibition in a mood induction paradigm2 
2.1 Introduction 
 Conscious control of goal-directed behaviour under conditions of strong affective 
experience can have serious repercussions in the real world. Military leaders must make 
calculated decisions involving the safety of their soldiers, first responders need to act effectively 
in emergency situations, and journalists must provide accurate reporting of events under 
formidable time constraints. Even comparatively mundane acts, like deciding what to wear on a 
first date or what food to prepare for a picky child, often entail at least some affective load.  
Executive functions (EF) refer to cognitive control mechanisms that are required for 
identifying, working toward, and accomplishing goals (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Numerous 
conceptualizations of EF have been offered, spanning neurobiological, cognitive/behavioural, 
and computational levels of analysis (Banich, 2009). Whilst myriad executive skills have been 
identified, keeping goal-relevant information in mind (i.e., working memory; Baddeley, 1992), 
flexibly switching between task-sets (Monsell, 2003), and withholding pre-potent yet goal-
incongruent actions (i.e., response inhibition; Nigg, 2000) are widely viewed as central to the EF 
construct (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). 
Lived experience suggests that EF is subject to affective influences like mood; however, 
different theoretical accounts give rise to varying predictions about the influence of mood states 
on specific executive skills. Cognitive load theory posits that all moods impose demands on 
cognitive resources, leading to the prediction that any mood state will interfere with EF-task 
 
2 A version of this chapter is published as Gabel, M. S., & McAuley, T. (2020). React to act: Negative mood, 
response inhibition, and the moderating role of emotional reactivity. Motivation and Emotion, 1-8. It is reproduced 
here with permission. 
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performance (e.g., Seibert & Ellis, 1991). In contrast, mood-as-information theory posits that 
moods may help or hinder EF-task performance depending on the cognitive consequences that a 
specific mood state engenders. In their cognitive cuing account, for example, Schwarz and Clore 
(2003) suggest that negative moods signify threat and engender an analytic processing style that 
is beneficial for tasks requiring close attention to detail. Conversely, positive moods signify 
safety and promote a heuristic processing style that is advantageous for tasks involving 
creativity, fluency, and cognitive flexibility. Similar predictions follow from Fredrickson’s 
(2001) broaden-and-build account, which posits a link between different mood states and 
thought-action repertoires. Here, it is suggested that negative moods encourage decisive 
responses to immediate threat, whereas positive moods facilitate engagement in exploratory tasks 
that build adaptive behaviour for future use. A review conducted by Mitchell & Phillips (2007) 
concluded that there was not compelling support for these theoretical perspectives based on 
available evidence at that time. Although positive moods were consistently shown to bolster 
performance on tasks requiring flexible and/or expansive thinking, few studies had explored the 
interplay of negative moods and task performance and reported findings were mixed.  
Considerable work has explored affective influences on cognition, most notably memory 
(e.g., Murray et al., 2013, Forgas & Koch, 2013). To extend this body of work to EF, our 
previous study examined the interplay between mood and performance on tasks of response 
inhibition and working memory (Gabel & McAuley, 2018). Given heterogeneity of extant 
research findings, we were particularly keen to explore whether these associations might be 
moderated by emotional reactivity – a stable individual differences trait that reflects the rapidity, 
intensity, and duration of negative, but not positive, affective responses (Howland et al., 2017; 
Nock et al., 2008). We found that task performance was degraded with increasing negative mood 
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for low-reactive individuals whereas high-reactive individuals tended to show the converse 
pattern in a sample that included undergraduate students. These results were obtained when 
response inhibition and working memory were modeled as latent constructs and were replicated 
on all three of the response inhibition tasks that were individually examined. Given our pattern of 
findings, we speculated that high-reactive individuals may have performed better than low-
reactive individuals when in a negative mood state because for them these states are affectively 
‘normal’. Consistent with this speculation, we found that increasing emotional reactivity was 
significantly correlated with higher level of negative (but not positive) affect in our sample. 
Likewise, other work also has reported that emotional reactivity is associated with more frequent 
and long-lasting negative moods (e.g., Compas et al., 2004; Nock et al., 2008). In the context of 
our study, an implication of the foregoing is that negative mood may have placed lesser cognitive 
demands on high- compared with low-reactive individuals and so they were able to invest more 
of their attentional resources into performing the tasks at hand. This explanation suggests that an 
integration of cognitive load and mood-as-information theories may yield a more nuanced and 
accurate understanding of affective influences on EF than either perspective considered in 
isolation. 
In our previous study, EF task performance was examined in relation to naturally occurring 
variations in negative and positive mood in a cross-sectional research design. Whilst this 
approach enabled us to capitalize on individual differences in the mood states that students 
brought into the lab, it tempered our conclusions regarding the potential for mood to directly 
impact EF. To address this limitation and replicate our prior findings, we present here a 
conceptually similar follow-up study that uses an experimental mood manipulation to induce 
positive or negative mood prior to administration of an EF task. We selected the Stop Signal task 
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because it is a well-established and psychometrically sound measure of response inhibition that 
we used in our previous study that has also been used in other investigations of mood-EF 
associations (Kalanthroff et al., 2013; Pessoa et al., 2012; Verbruggen, & De Houwer, 2007). 
Integrating predictions from both cognitive load and mood-as-information theories coupled with 
results of our previous study, we hypothesized that induction of negative mood would hinder 
performance on an inhibitory task (per cognitive load theory) except in highly-reactive 
individuals, for whom negative mood may be more affectively normal and thus less cognitively 
depleting. As such, we expected that highly-reactive individuals would benefit from the 
informational significance of a change in negative affect by increasing their attention to the 
inhibitory task (per mood-as-information theory). Of note, both theories predict a decrement in 
inhibitory performance following induction of positive mood. However, given other work 
demonstrating no effect of positive mood on response inhibition (Martin & Kerns, 2011), 
coupled with null results from our prior study, we expected that positive mood would have no 
bearing on inhibitory performance.  
2.2 Method 
Participants  
Participants were recruited through a departmental pool of students enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of Waterloo. Our previous study of undergraduates found a 
significant interaction between emotional reactivity and negative mood on inhibitory 
performance controlling for positive mood (∆R2 = .13; Gabel & McAuley, 2018). Using the 
software program G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), we calculated the sample size required for an R2 
increase with the following parameters: f = .15 (corresponding to R2 = .13), α = .05 and β =. 80. 
This analysis indicated that 55 participants were required, consistent with the a priori power 
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analysis of Shields et al., (2016) who conducted a conceptually similar study with a total of 150 
participants across 3 groups. In our study, we doubled our target sample size due to the inclusion 
of both a negative and positive mood induction condition. In total, 121 undergraduates 
completed a 30-minute experimental procedure for course credit (Mage = 19.97 years, SD = 2.29 
years, 70% female, 42% Caucasian 30% Asian, 7% South Asian, 21% Other).  
Measures 
 Visual Analog Ratings. Separate visual analogue scales were used to assess positive and 
negative feelings experienced by participants in the moment via mouse-click. Instructions asked 
participants to, ‘rate how you are currently experiencing positive and negative emotions ranging 
from 0-100, where 0 corresponds to no positive or negative emotion at all and 100 represents 
very strong positive or negative emotion.’ Ratings were obtained in both the negative and 
positive mood conditions at baseline, post-induction and post-task. These ratings were used as a 
manipulation check to see if appropriate affect increased or decreased from baseline to post-
induction and to see if this effect remained until completion of the Stop Signal task.  
Stop Signal Task (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984). Participants made a speeded choice 
keypress response to a centrally presented stimulus (pink or yellow star) except when the 
stimulus was followed by an auditory signal that cued them to cancel their response. Timing of 
the stop signal, referred to as the stop signal delay (SSD), was initially set to 250 ms post-
stimulus onset for all participants. The SSD was subsequently adjusted based on each 
participant’s response on the preceding stop trial: SSD was increased by 50 ms following a 
failure to inhibit and was decreased by 50 ms following a successful inhibit. Because timing of 
the SSD influences the likelihood of inhibitory success, having this dynamic tracking algorithm 
calibrated to each individual participant ensured that they were able to successfully inhibit their 
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responses on approximately half of stop trials (see also Band et al., 2003).  The task was 
presented in four blocks that each included 8 stop trials and 24 go trials. Stop signal reaction time 
(SSRT), calculated in ms as the mean SSD subtracted from the mean reaction time of correct 
responses on go trials, is a well-validated metric of inhibitory ability (M = 298.42, SD = 64.16, 
95% CI [286.24 – 310.60], Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS; Nock et al., 2008). Participants rated their reactions to 21 
items using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from not at all like me (0) to completely like me (4). 
Items reflected emotional sensitivity (e.g., “my feelings get hurt easily”), emotional persistence 
(e.g., “when something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about for a long time”), and 
emotional arousal/intensity (e.g., “when I experience emotions I feel them very 
strongly/intensely”), which were summed to create a total score (M = 33.30, SD = 18.57, 95% CI 
[29.86 – 36.74], Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Demographic Questionnaire. Included were questions regarding age, sex, ethnicity, and 
medical history. 
Procedure 
All participants completed the experiment in the same fixed order. Participants were first 
asked to complete visual analogue scales reflecting the extent of their positive and negative 
feelings at that moment. Using a variant of the mood induction procedure described by Eich and 
colleagues (Eich et al., 2007), participants were then randomly assigned to a positive (n = 61) or 
negative (n = 60) mood induction condition in which they were asked to think about an event 
that was upsetting (e.g., failure on a test) or happy (e.g., visiting with a close friend) whilst 
listening to mood-congruent music (Mars, the Bringer of War and Venus, the Bringer of Peace, 
respectively). These pieces have been utilized previously to elicit positive and negative emotions 
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(Quigley et al., 2012). The duration of the mood induction procedure was 5 minutes for 
participants in both conditions. Afterward, participants provided visual analogue ratings, 
completed the Stop Signal task, provided visual analogue ratings again, and then completed the 
Emotion Reactivity Scale and Demographic Questionnaire. 
2.3 Results 
Data were missing for ten participants on the Stop Signal task and from four participants 
on the ERS. Missing data were imputed using AMOS 25 based on 40 iterations of 30 000 
observations of the regression model with a maximum autocorrelation of 0.1 and a tuning 
parameter of 0.7. All analyses were then completed with SPSS version 25. Pooled parameters 
were used to estimate the true effects of the predictive model (Graham, 2009). Results were 
unchanged when analyses were undertaken using only participants with complete data.  
Descriptive statistics for affect ratings in each condition and time point are presented in 
Table 2.1. Effectiveness of the mood induction was evaluated using a 2x3 mixed factors 
ANOVA, with time (baseline, post-induction, post-task) and mood rating (positive, negative) as 
repeated-measures factors and condition (negative, positive) as a between-group factor. The 
three-way interaction was significant [F(2, 176) = 53.56, p < 001]. To verify that there was an 
effect attributable to the mood manipulation that was present after the induction and evident after 
completion of the Stop Signal task, we evaluated group differences in positive and negative 
ratings at each time point. There were no significant group differences in affective ratings at 
baseline (Fs <1). However, ratings of positive mood were significantly higher in the positive vs. 
negative induction condition both post-induction [F(1, 104) = 56.59, p < .001] and post-task 
[F(1, 103) = 25.65, p < .001]. Likewise, ratings of negative mood were significantly higher in the 
negative vs. positive induction condition both post-induction [F(1, 97) = 52.43, p < .001] and 
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post-task [F(1, 97) = 24.87, p < .001]. Correlational analyses further demonstrated that the 
change in negative and positive affect ratings (i.e., post induction less baseline) was not 
significantly correlated with emotional reactivity in either mood induction condition (p’s > .68). 
Results indicate that our procedure elicited the intended mood state and that the degree to which 
this mood state was induced did not differ based on level of emotional reactivity (Figure 2.1). 
Interestingly, post-induction and post-task negative affect were not correlated with emotional 





   
Figure 2.1.  
Mean intensity ratings for positive and negative mood obtained at three time-points in each 





   
Table 2.1.  
Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals for positive and negative affect 
ratings in mood induction conditions at each time point. 
Condition Time Affect  Mean SD 95% CI 
Negative  Baseline Positive 65.53 19.80 60.61, 70.45 
Negative 26.43 22.15 21.19, 31.68 
Post-Induction Positive 45.62 19.10 40.56, 50.69 
Negative 45.17 20.66 40.22, 50.13 
Post-Task Positive 47.81 21.58 42.34, 53.28 
Negative 36.04 20.45 30.85, 41.22 
Positive Baseline Positive 67.48 16.00 62.41, 72.55 
Negative 20.38 15.56 14.98, 25.78 
Post-Induction Positive 77.26 18.04 72.04, 82.48 
Negative 13.02 15.11   7.92, 18.12 
Post-Task Positive 69.16 18.34 63.53, 74.79 
Negative 16.20 17.40 10.86, 21.53 
 
Multiple linear regression was used to model SSRT as a function of mood induction 
condition, emotional reactivity, and their interaction. Age and gender were not significantly 
associated with SSRT (p’s > .321) and so were not entered as co-variates. The overall model was 
statistically significant, R2 = .09, F(3, 117) = 3.83, p = .01, 95% CI [.10 – .49]. Neither emotional 
reactivity (B = -.62, SE = .35, p = .08, 95% CI [-1.32 – .08]) nor mood induction condition (B = -
15.97, SE = 11.92, p = .18, 95% CI [-39.81 – 7.87]) were significant predictors of SSRT alone. 
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However, the interaction term emerged as a significant predictor of SSRT, ∆R2 = .043, F(1, 117) 
= 4.93, B = 1.43, SE = .70, p = .04, 95% CI [.06 – 2.80]. Using pooled data from the multiple 
imputation, simple slopes for the regression of emotional reactivity on Stop Signal performance 
were tested in the mood induction conditions using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 
2017). As shown in Figure 2.2, performance did not vary as a function of reactivity level within 
the positive condition (B = .10, SE = .45, p = .83, 95% CI [-0.80 – .90]). Within the negative 
condition, however, performance improved with increasing levels of reactivity (B = 1.35, SE = 
.55, p = .02, 95% CI [0.25 – 2.45]).  
 
Figure 2.2. Simple slopes demonstrating the regression of emotional reactivity on inhibitory 




   
Our final analysis examined whether the interaction of emotional reactivity with 
individual differences in post-induction negative mood predicted inhibitory performance with 
post-induction positive mood treated as a covariate. Using the PROCESS (Hayes, 2017), the 
regression of SSRT on negative affect was examined in those with average, high (+1 SD of the 
mean), and low (-1 SD of the mean) levels of emotional reactivity. As shown in Figure 2.3, this 
analysis demonstrated that highly reactive individuals had significantly faster SSRTs with 
increasing negative mood (B = -.43, SE = .21, p = .04, 95% CI [-.86 - .02]) and, individuals low 
in reactivity showed the converse pattern (B = .34, SE = .24, p = .15, 95% CI [-.13 – .81]). For 
individuals average in reactivity mood was unrelated to task performance (B = -.05, SE = .17, p = 
.77, 95% CI [-.38 - -.28]).  
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Figure 2.3.  
Simple slopes demonstrating the regression of individual differences in negative affect on 




Our study joins a body of work aimed at further elucidating the nature of mood-cognition 
associations through the incorporation of theoretically informed moderators. Individual 
differences factors such as personality have previously demonstrated a moderating effect of 
affect on some aspects of cognition (Stafford et al., 2010; Tamir & Robinson, 2004, Tamir et al., 
2002). In one study, for example, individuals high in extraversion demonstrated superior 
performance on a task of creativity following induction of positive mood. There also was a main 
effect of positive mood on a free recall task, but no main effect or interaction of positive mood 
and extraversion on inhibitory performance (Stafford et al., 2010). In another study, individuals 
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high in neuroticism were faster to categorize words when naturally experiencing higher levels of 
negative mood – a finding that was replicated when negative mood was experimentally induced 
(Tamir & Robinson, 2004). Our findings in the current study were highly consistent with the 
findings of Tamir and Robinson (2004). The affective certainty model suggested by Tamir and 
colleagues (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002) builds on cognitive load theory by 
proposing that trait-inconsistent moods, such as an individual high in neuroticism who is feeling 
positive, will lead to more interference then when moods are consistent with how individuals 
typically feel. The authors’ explanation of their results suggested that state-trait incongruent 
moods build uncertainty or ambiguity which may then interfere with decision making. This is a 
plausible explanation as to why we might have observed the pattern of results in the current 
study within the negative mood condition and also helps us to understand the interaction in 
Gabel and McAuley (2018). Within the current study, however, it is inconsistent with Tamir and 
Robinson (2004) in that there was no evidence of high reactive individuals performing worse in 
the positive mood condition.  
Given that emotional reactivity is not related to positive mood while positive mood is 
negative related to neuroticism, it is likely that positive moods are not state incongruent for 
individuals higher in reactivity. In both Gabel and McAuley (2018) and the current study, there 
is no correlation between emotional reactivity and positive affect. It is interesting to note that 
higher levels of extraversion and neuroticism are frequently associated with stronger responses to 
positive and negative mood inductions, respectively (e.g., Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). We would 
expect emotional reactivity to be related to increased change in negative affect through a 
negative mood induction given it is thought to be related to increased sensitivity to and intensity 
of negative emotions. In our study, however, post-induction changes in mood were not 
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associated with level of emotional reactivity. In our sample, although change in negative affect 
was unrelated to emotional reactivity, the pattern of results predicted response inhibition 
performance in a way that was consistent with Gabel and McAuely (2018). It may be the case 
that emotionally reactive individuals do not have more intense emotional reactions to mood 
inductions in a lab setting. This has been supported in the literature (Boyes et al., 2020) such that 
emotionally reactive individuals respond similarly to non-reactive individuals to negative mood 
induction procedures, but that negative mood caused by mood inductions is more persistent for 
these reactive individuals. Our predictions as to why emotional reactivity might be beneficial 
(i.e., affective certainty) relates more to emotional persistence than emotional intensity and thus 
we do not view this null finding as particularly troubling. 
This study, a conceptual follow-up to Gabel & McAuley (2018), provides a more 
rigorous examination of the interplay between emotional reactivity with mood on EF by using an 
experimental research design. Our first analysis demonstrated that inhibitory performance was 
worse amongst individuals lower in reactivity in the negative vs. positive mood induction 
condition. For them, being randomized to the negative mood induction resulted in a clear 
performance decrement that was not observed for individuals higher in reactivity. Indeed, 
whereas the SSRTs of individuals lower in reactivity were slowed by induction of negative mood 
those of individuals higher in reactivity were clearly buffered from this deleterious effect (Figure 
2.2). Our second analysis examined individual differences in post-induction negative mood and 
further demonstrated that individuals higher in reactivity had significantly faster SSRTs as 
negative mood increased. For them, inhibitory performance appeared to benefit from increases in 
negative mood when examined continuously across conditions (Figure 2.3). These findings are 
consistent with those of our initial study and with the affective certainty model but are 
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demonstrated here with an experimental mood induction procedure, thereby increasing our 
confidence that negative mood influenced inhibitory task performance and not vice versa. 
A question that follows from our work is why emotional reactivity moderated the 
influence of negative mood on inhibitory performance. While the facilitative effect observed in 
individuals higher in reactivity is consistent with the affective certainty model (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002), it is not in opposition to the mood-as-information theory, 
which suggests that negative moods instill a more analytic mindset that is helpful for performing 
some kinds of cognitive tasks (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 2003). At the same time, the 
performance decrement observed among individuals lower in reactivity, which is also consistent 
with the affective certainty model, is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the mood-as-
information theory. Trait-inconsistent mood states might engender substantial cognitive load 
(e.g., task-irrelevant thoughts, active emotion regulation) that interferes with an analytic thinking 
style improving task performance (see Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Future research might actively 
manipulate thinking style (analytic vs. heuristic) to better understand how it relates to response 
inhibition performance. 
The forgoing suggests that the cognitive sequela of negative moods vary with individual 
differences in what is affectively normal. This has been demonstrated with emotional reactivity 
(Gabel & McAuley, 2018), as well as with related constructs such as neuroticism (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2004) and extraversion (Tamir et al., 2002). In the case of the current study, it may be 
that highly reactive individuals have developed specific attentional strategies for dealing with 
threat that coincide with task performance. For example, an avoidant strategy (e.g., distraction, 
expressive suppression) could be beneficial for task performance by preventing engagement with 
regulatory strategies that are known to interfere with executive skills – an example of which is 
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rumination (Curci et al., 2012; Koster et al., 2013). Conversely, low-reactive individuals may be 
less likely to have developed specific strategies when confronted with threat, thereby 
demonstrating more attentional ambivalence when threat arises during performance of a task. 
Interestingly, a study by Nelson and colleagues (2015) presented participants with pairs of 
negative and neutral images and found that individuals who experienced conflict about where to 
direct their attention - expressing high motivation to both monitor and avoid the disturbing 
pictures – actually demonstrated the greatest vigilance toward threat. One can readily imagine 
how this attentional bias would be detrimental to task performance and interfere with the ability 
to effectively utilize executive skills. 
Considering our findings, it is worth noting that heightened emotional reactivity is a risk 
factor for depression starting as early as adolescence (Charbonneau et al., 2009; Pine et al., 
2001). Further, both current and remitted depression have been associated with broad cognitive 
deficits, including deficits in attention and related executive skills (Mac Giollabhui et al., 2020; 
Rock et al., 2014; Snyder, 2013). One study of adolescents demonstrated that more severe levels 
of depression were concurrently and prospectively associated with lower levels of performance 
on attention tasks, with the latter mediated by interleukin-6 – suggesting that biological markers 
of inflammation may account for some of the heterogeneity that has been reported in research 
examining the interplay of mood and cognition (Mac Giollabhui et al., 2020). Research on 
subclinical dysphoria has yielded more equivocal findings – with EF deficits associated with 
mild depressive symptoms in some studies (Ganguli et al., 2009) but not in others (Bunce et al., 
2008). Reflecting on our results, the high reactivity evidenced in our sample of undergraduate 
students may represent an ‘optimal zone’ for effectively utilizing moderate levels of negative 
mood while ignoring or more efficiently processing task-irrelevant negative information to adapt 
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to the changing needs of the environment. These findings would likely not generalize to a 
clinical sample such as individuals with a diagnosis of depression or an anxiety disorder. 
Our results, though telling a consistent story, should be interpreted in the context of 
several caveats. One limitation is that response inhibition was not measured prior to the mood 
induction, which precludes us from making any claims regarding potential changes in baseline 
inhibitory performance following the experimental manipulation. Similarly, it is impossible to 
discern whether individuals’ baseline EF influenced the potency of the mood induction 
procedure. Another limitation is that students were generally feeling good at the time they 
entered our lab, as indicated by high ratings of positive mood and low ratings of negative mood 
at baseline. This resulted in there being more affective movement in the negative relative to 
positive mood induction conditions. There was a relatively modest increase in ratings of positive 
affect post-induction, but perhaps one that was not sufficiently strong to engender cognitive 
demands or induce a more heuristic processing style. This may explain why we did not find any 
main effects or interactions involving positive mood in our current investigation nor in our prior 
work. A final consideration is that negative mood was treated as a unitary construct in our study; 
however, a potentially informative direction for future work will be to adopt a more nuanced 
approach to the examination of mood states. The measurement of mood through single-item 
visual analogue scales had the benefit of being quick and thus not taking away from the mood 
induction procedure. However, the drawback is that it is hard to get a reliable and qualitative 
estimate of negative affect that would be achieved through utilizing a composite scale. The 
qualitative essence of a negative mood can make a difference in underlying motivation. Shields 
and colleagues, for example, reported that the induction of anxiety led to more perseverative 
errors on a card sorting task compared with the induction of anger (Shields et al., 2016). 
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Although both are negative moods high in arousal, anger is approach-based and anxiety is 
avoidant-based. The authors posit that these different motivational systems may exert differential 
effects on cognition and behaviour, citing other evidence showing greater depletion of cognitive 
resources in the context of avoidant relative to approach motivation (see Roskes et al., 2013). In 
their study, they speculate that induction of anxiety impaired sorting performance via an overall 
reduction in cognitive resources. Another study by Grahek and colleagues (2018) examining 
cognitive control has suggested difficulties with motivation and engagement (e.g., anhedonia) 
within depressed individuals leads to impaired task performance. Accordingly, it would be 
important to replicate the findings of Shields and colleagues (2016) with groups of individuals 
highlighting approach and avoidance motivation, as well as to explore the effect of deactivated 
motivational states such as anhedonia.  
In sum, our study suggests that higher levels of emotional reactivity may buffer the 
potentially deleterious influence of negative mood on EF. Here and in our prior work, we have 
demonstrated that lower levels of emotional reactivity may lead to poorer performance with 
increased negative affect which is more trait-inconsistent for individuals at this end of the 
reactivity scale. Taken together, the consistency of our results points to emotional reactivity as an 
important moderator of mood-EF associations. Our understanding of this phenomenon is still 
preliminary, however, and we have suggested several ways in which it may be advanced in order 
to better understand what it is about emotional reactivity that may be helpful for some yet a 
hindrance to others. In so doing, we believe that our field will begin to unpack the complex 




   
Chapter 3: Why might negative mood help or hinder inhibitory performance? An 
exploration of thinking styles using a Navon induction  
3.1 Introduction 
Executive functions (EF) are inter-related cognitive abilities necessary for identifying, 
progressing toward, re-evaluating and accomplishing goals (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Response 
inhibition is widely viewed as a core executive skill reflecting the interruption of naturally pre-
potent or previously reinforced responses (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Given consensus 
agreement that response inhibition is central to the EF construct, coupled with its associations 
with other fundamental aspects of EF (e.g., working memory and switching) as well as more 
complex behaviours (e.g., planning), understanding contextual influences on response inhibition 
is an important goal for research (Friedman & Miyake, 2017, 2004; Miyake & Friedman, 2012).  
Although in-lab tasks of response inhibition have been developed to be non-emotional, 
the application of response inhibition in day-to-day life is often utilized in affective situations. 
Considerable work has demonstrated that the relationship between response inhibition and affect 
is reciprocal in nature (Pessoa, 2009). Studies using classic inhibitory paradigms have shown that 
responses to emotional stimuli can be successfully inhibited (e.g., Kalanthroff et al., 2013; 
Schulz et al., 2007), as can emotional responses to affective situations (e.g., von Hippel et al., 
2005). This is evident in the normalcy bias, in which individuals assume they are safe and so 
under-react to potential or imminent threats (Drabek, 2012; Omer & Alon, 1994; Valentine & 
Smith, 2002). Indeed, during the COVID-19 pandemic governmental and individual responses to 
limit the spread of this disease have been greatly hindered by our reinforced response to keep 
calm and carry on. On the other hand, studies also have shown that emotional experiences have 
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the potential to modulate inhibitory performance (e.g., Albert et al., 2010; Verbruggen & de 
Houwer, 2007). 
Following from the above, our previous work explored the influence of mood on EF – 
including response inhibition – in studies examining natural variations in mood (Gabel & 
McAuley, 2018) and active manipulation of mood states (Gabel & McAuley, 2020). Although 
there were no main effects or interactions involving positive mood in either of our studies, 
negative mood was consistently associated with better performance for individuals higher in 
reactivity but the converse for those lower in reactivity. In the initial study we suggested that our 
findings incorporated the integration of two theoretical perspectives regarding the interplay of 
mood and cognition: mood-as-information theory which predicts that positive and negative 
moods engender different thinking styles that may be beneficial or detrimental to EF task 
performance pending the particulars of the task (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) 
and cognitive load theory, which posits that increased intensity of both positive and negative 
mood states will interfere with cognitive tasks through task-unrelated thoughts or active emotion 
regulation (Curci et al., 2013; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Seibert & Ellis, 1991). A third theory 
regarding mood’s relationship with cognition is that has been integrated into cognitive load and 
mood-as-information theories is the affective certainty model (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir 
et al., 2002). This theory proposes that trait-inconsistent mood states will interfere with 
performance on tasks of response inhibition. Emotional reactivity is a stable trait that reflects the 
rapidity, intensity, and duration of reactions to affective situations (Nock et al., 2008) – one that 
makes divergent predictions about the impact of negative mood on response inhibitory 
performance. Because negative affect is thought to be trait-consistent with those higher in 
emotional reactivity (Nock et al., 2008; Ripper et al., 2018), the occurrence of negative mood 
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does not interfere with task performance and task performance increases as negative affect 
increases for these individuals (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; 2020).  
Moreover, it is suggested that negative moods engender a more analytic thinking style 
that facilitates performance on EF tasks requiring close attention to detail. Given findings from 
our previous studies (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; 2020) it is possible that individuals higher in 
reactivity were able to utilize an analytic thinking style from increased negative affect without 
the corresponding increase in cognitive load because negative moods states are more likely trait-
consistent for these individuals. For less reactive individuals, however, the occurrence of 
negative mood is comparatively atypical and so may be associated with increased cognitive 
demands that are detrimental to performance on the same EF tasks. Although these ideas explain 
our pattern of findings, they are necessarily speculative because thinking style was not explicitly 
examined in our prior work. 
The current study goes one step further and explores the influence of thinking styles on 
inhibitory performance. Thinking styles were studied extensively in seminal work by David 
Navon (1977) using stimuli in which letters at the local level were embedded within the same or 
different letters at the global level (e.g., a large ‘H’ made up of either small ‘H’s or small ‘S’s, 
respectively). This research established that individuals have a bias toward processing 
information heuristically – for example, being significantly faster to respond in the global 
relative to local condition irrespective of stimulus congruity and, within the local condition, 
being especially slowed when local elements were incongruous with the global level (see Navon, 
1977 experiment 3). Considering these findings from a practical perspective, it would be 
laborious to be constantly analyzing what something is made up of in order to determine its form 
and so having a global or heuristic bias makes intuitive sense. 
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There is a widely supported link between thinking styles and mood (Srinivasan & Hanif, 
2010). People are generally happy and tend to think heuristically (Diener & Diener, 1996; 
Gasper & Clore, 2002; Xu et al., 2019). Experimental induction of positive emotions can also 
broaden attentional scope and lead to a stronger global bias in processing information 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Rowe et al., 2007). Research has demonstrated that positive 
mood states are not necessarily wed to heuristic thinking styles such that this global precedence 
can be overridden through priming local features (Huntsinger et al., 2010; 2014; Isbell et al., 
2016). Conversely, negative emotions are related to less heuristic thinking and a more analytic 
information processing style (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Rodriguez-Gomez et al., 2019; Smith et al., 
2014). Hence, while positive and negative moods are typically related to differing thinking 
styles, thinking styles can also be manipulated independent from mood state.  
 In the current investigation, we used a Navon task to experimentally induce either a 
heuristic or analytic approach to information processing by requiring that participants respond to 
a preponderance of information at either a global or local level, respectively. Pre-induction, we 
expected to replicate our previous findings that individual differences in emotional reactivity 
moderate an association between natural variations in negative mood on inhibitory performance 
(Gabel & McAuley, 2018). Post-induction, we predicted that participants would demonstrate 
better inhibitory performance in the analytic compared with heuristic condition. Within each 
condition, however, we further expected to observe a different pattern of effects post-induction 
involving negative mood, inhibitory performance, and emotional reactivity. In the heuristic 
condition we expected that negative mood would predict better inhibitory performance for 
participants higher in reactivity and worse inhibitory performance for participants lower in 
reactivity. This prediction is based on the idea that increased negative mood will engender 
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analytic thinking and counter the heuristic thinking style that is meant to be enhanced through 
the Navon induction (i.e., processing information at a global level) for participants who are 
highly-reactive. Conversely, negative affect should act as cognitive load for those lower in 
reactivity based on the idea that these emotional experiences will need to be regulated (e.g., 
rumination, cognitive reappraisal) as they are not typically experienced by these individuals. This 
would result in an interaction between negative mood and emotional reactivity on inhibitory 
performance. In contrast, in the analytic condition we expected that negative mood would predict 
better inhibitory performance irrespective of emotional reactivity. This prediction is based on the 
idea that negative mood engenders an analytic thinking style in high-reactive individuals which 
would be further enhanced through the Navon induction (i.e., processing information at a local 
level).  For low-reactive participants, we expected that the induction would focus attention on 
local features of the task and override cognitive load that seems to be more typically associated 
with negative mood (e.g., rumination, cognitive reappraisal; Brinker et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky et 
al., 2003). This would result in a main effect of negative mood but no interaction between 
negative mood and emotional reactivity in the analytic condition. Consistent with our prior work, 
we did not expect positive mood to have an effect in either condition. 
3.2 Method 
Participants  
Participants were recruited through a departmental pool of students enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of Waterloo. A priori power analysis was conducted using 
G*Power (Faul et al., 2009). Because the size of group differences based on this induction was 
unknown, the power analysis was based on the average effect size of Gabel & McAuley (2018) 
for the interaction of negative affect and emotional reactivity on inhibitory performance (R2 
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=.13). This effect should be replicated in the Heuristic condition given Navon’s (1977) research 
suggesting a global bias through natural variations in mood which are thought to be generally 
positive (Diener & Diener, 1996). Based on this model with α=.05 and β=.80 we estimated that 
we would need at least 79 participants in the Heuristic condition. We aimed to collect the same 
number of participants for the Analytic condition. In total, one-hundred sixty-eight 
undergraduates completed a 30-minute experimental procedure for course credit (Mage = 22.23 
years, SD = 2.96 years, 81% female, 26% Caucasian 32% Asian, 23% Other). 
Measures 
    Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). This 20-item scale (Watson et al., 
1988) asked participants to rate their experience of 10 positive adjectives (e.g., “excited”) and 10 
negative adjectives (e.g., “afraid”) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very slightly or not at 
all (1) to extremely (5) over the past week. Responses were totaled within each subscale, which 
were internally consistent in our sample (positive affect: M = 31.0, SD = 7.16, 95% CI [29.90 – 
32.10], Cronbach’s α = .87; negative affect: M = 22.84, SD = 7.77, 95% CI [21.63 – 24.03], 
Cronbach’s α = .88). 
Task Stop Signal Task (Logan et al., 1984). Participants made a speeded choice key press 
response to a centrally presented stimulus (i.e., a pink or yellow star) except when the stimulus 
was followed by an auditory signal that cued them to cancel their response. Timing of this 
auditory signal (i.e., the stop signal), referred to as the stop signal delay (SSD), was initially set 
to 250 ms post-stimulus onset for all participants. The SSD was subsequently adjusted based on 
each participant’s response on the preceding stop trial: SSD was increased by 50 ms following a 
failure to inhibit and was decreased by 50 ms following a successful inhibit. Because timing of 
the SSD influences the likelihood of inhibitory success, having this dynamic tracking algorithm 
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calibrated to each individual participant ensured that they were able to successfully inhibit their 
responses on approximately half of stop trials (see also Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 2003). 
The task was presented in three blocks that each included 16 (25%) stop trials and 48 (75%) go 
trials. Stop signal reaction time (SSRT) was calculated in ms as the mean SSD subtracted from 
the average time taken to correctly respond on non ‘stop’ trials (M = 298.42, SD = 64.16, 95% CI 
[286.24 – 310.60], Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Modified Navon Task (Navon, 1977). Participants were randomly assigned to the analytic 
or heuristic induction condition. Each trial began with a centrally positioned fixation cross for 
500 ms. After disappearance of the fixation, a Navon stimulus appeared in the centre of the 
screen. In both conditions, these stimuli consisted of a large letter made up of seven smaller 
letters in height and five smaller letters in width (Appendix). Participants were instructed to press 
the ‘H’ response key if an H was apparent in either the global or local level and the ‘L’ response 
key if an L was apparent in either the global or local level. The stimulus remained on the screen 
until participants made a response or 2000 ms had elapsed. There was a blank inter-trial interval 
of 1000 ms and then the next trial began.  The heuristic condition consisted of 75% global trials 
and 25% local trials. Conversely, the analytic consisted of 75% local trails and 25% global 
trials. This induction procedure took place between blocks 1 and 2 (40 trials) and blocks 2 and 3 
(20 trials) of the Stop Signal task. The Navon induction has been shown to be short-lived which 
necessitated the utilization of two induction timepoints to ensure effectiveness across blocks of 
the Stop Signal task (Macrae & Lewis, 2002; Mundy, 2014; Perfect et al., 2007). The numbers of 
trials was chosen to ensure that the induction was effective whilst minimizing the potential for 
fatigue to subsequently influence performance on the Stop Signal task.  
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Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS). Participants rated their reactions to 21 items (Nock et al., 
2008) using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from not at all like me (0) to completely like me (4). 
Items reflected emotional sensitivity (e.g., “my feelings get hurt easily”), emotional persistence 
(e.g., “when something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about for a long time”), and 
emotional arousal/intensity (e.g., “when I experience emotions I feel them very 
strongly/intensely”), which were summed to create a total score (M = 32.96, SD = 18.49, 95% CI 
[30.10 – 35.82], Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Demographic Questionnaire. Included were questions regarding age, sex, ethnicity, and 
medical history. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to a heuristic (n = 85) or analytic (n = 83) thinking 
style induction condition. All participants completed tasks in the same fixed order. They first 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule and the Emotion Reactivity Scale. They 
then completed a baseline block of the Stop Signal Task, followed by the thinking style induction 
in which they completed a variant of the Navon task (Navon, 1977). This was followed by 
another block of the Stop Signal task, a repetition of the modified Navon task, and then a final 
Stop Signal block. Participants then completed the Demographic Questionnaire. 
3.3 Results 
All analyses were completed using SPSS version 26. Data were missing for one 
participant on the Stop Signal task when the program crashed. Another six participants were 
excluded from analysis because they did not follow instructions on the Stop Signal task (e.g., 
responded immediately or were overly cautious resulting in less than 10% correct go trials). 
Scores on self-report measures and task response times were within reasonable limits of 
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normality (i.e., 95% CI of skew and kurtosis <1.96, Kolmogorov-Smirnov p > .05) and no 
univariate or multivariate outliers were observed in either group. The final sample of 161 
participants included 81 participants in the heuristic condition and 80 participants in the analytic 
condition. 
Assessment of baseline group differences  
First, a one-way ANOVA was used to ensure that participants did not differ on emotional 
reactivity or positive and negative affect between conditions. Results indicated no group 
differences on these variables (p’s > .23). Next, a paired samples t-test was analyzed as a check 
to see if positive mood was significantly higher than negative mood in both conditions. As 
expected, positive mood was significantly higher than negative mood in both the analytic (t [79] 
= -7.24 p < .01) and heuristic conditions (t [80] = -6.45 p < .01). Participants averaged 2.3 on 
negative affect items (i.e., a little) and 3.1 on positive items (i.e., moderately) across conditions. 
Additionally, correlational analyses were done to confirm that emotional reactivity was 
correlated with negative, but not positive mood in both conditions. Results support this 
hypothesis with emotional reactivity related to negative but not positive mood in both the 
heuristic (negative: r [81] = .59, p < .01; positive: r [81] = .04, p =.71). and analytic conditions 
(negative: r [80] = .60, p < .01; positive: r [80] = -.15, p = .20). Applying a Fisher’s r-z 
transformation confirms that the correlation between emotional reactivity and negative and 
positive affect were of significantly different magnitude (heuristic: z = 3.98, p < .01; analytic: z = 
5.24, p < .01). 
Manipulation check 
Effectiveness of the thinking style induction was next evaluated using a 2x2 mixed 
factors ANOVA, with Navon task trial type (global, local) as the within-subjects factor and 
 
43 
   
condition (analytic, heuristic) as a between-group factor. Emotional reactivity, positive and 
negative affect and the interaction of emotional reactivity and negative affect were added as 
potential moderators of the interaction between trial type and condition. As predicted, the two-
way interaction was significant (F[1, 153] = 231.28, p < .01) such that those in the heuristic 
condition responded significantly faster to global trials while those in the analytic condition 
responded significantly faster to the local trials (see Figure 3.1). No moderators listed above 
significantly predicted this relationship (p’s > .36). These results suggest that the induction was 
effective at inducing the target thinking style (heuristic or analytic) regardless of pre-existing 
affective experience or emotional reactivity. 
Figure 3.1.  
Bar chart representing between group differences in average reaction times to local and global 




















   
 
Emotional reactivity as a moderator of negative mood and inhibitory performance at baseline 
 To test the hypothesis that emotional reactivity would moderate the association of 
negative affect and inhibitory performance at baseline, positive and negative affect, as well as 
emotional reactivity and the interaction of emotional reactivity and negative affect were entered 
into a regression model predicting baseline SSRT. The model at baseline was not statistically 
significant, R2 = .02, F[4, 153] < 1, p = .643. No direct effects of positive or negative mood, 
emotional reactivity, or a mean-centred interaction between negative mood and emotional 
reactivity were present at baseline SSRT (p’s > .37).  
Comparison of inhibitory performance across conditions 
 To test the hypothesis that an analytic thinking style would lead to faster (i.e., better) 
performance on the Stop Signal task relative to a heuristic thinking style, a 2x3 repeated 
measures ANOVA with time (baseline, post-induction 1, and post-induction 2 SSRT) as the 
repeated measures factor and condition (analytic, heuristic) as a between subjects factor was 
utilized. There was no significant effect of condition (F[1, 157] < 1, p = .51; see Figure 3.2). 
There was a significant main effect of time (F[2, 314] = 22.45, p < .01), such that SSRT was not 
different from baseline to post-induction 1 (t[157] = -1.50, p = .14) but was significantly faster 
from post-induction 1 to post-induction 2  (t[160] = 6.60, p < .01) across conditions. The 




   
Figure 3.2.  




Emotional reactivity as a moderator of negative mood and post-induction inhibitory 
performance in the heuristic condition 
         Next, hierarchical regression was used to test the hypothesis that emotional reactivity 
would moderate an association between negative mood and post-induction SSRT (i.e., average 
SSRT across blocks 2 and 3) in the heuristic condition. After controlling for positive affect in 
step 1, negative affect and emotional reactivity were entered as predictors in step two and the 
mean-centred interaction of negative affect and emotional reactivity was entered as a predictor in 
step three. Overall, the model predicted 13% of the variance in Stop Signal task performance (R2 
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= .13, F [4, 76] = 2.85, p = .03). There was no effect of positive affect at step one (R2 = .00, B = 
.63, SE = 1.11, t < 1, p = .57, 95% CI [-1.59 – 2.85]). Negative affect and emotional reactivity 
did not add a significant amount of variance in step two (∆R2 = .02, ΔF[2, 77] < 1, p =.39, 
negative affect: B = -1.34, SE = 1.26, t = -1.06 p = .29, 95% CI [-3.85 – 1.17], emotional 
reactivity: B = -.04, SE = .54, p = .94, 95% CI [-1.11 – 1.13]). However, there was a significant 
interaction between negative affect and emotional reactivity at step three (∆R2 = .10, ΔF[1, 76] = 
8.96, p <.01, B = -23.64, SE = 7.90, t = -2.99, p < .01, 95% CI [-39.38 – -7.91]).  
Using PROCESS version 3.4 (Hayes, 2014), simple slopes for the regression of negative 
affect on SSRT were tested at low (-1 SD below the mean), average, and high (+1 SD above the 
mean) levels of emotional reactivity. There was no significant effect of negative affect at low 
levels of emotional reactivity, although numerically these individuals tended to do worse on the 
Stop Signal task the more negative affect they experienced (B = 3.14, SE = 1.92, t = 1.64, p = 
.11, 95% CI [-.68 – 6.96]). There also was no effect for average levels of emotional reactivity (B 
= -.09, SE = 1.29, t < 1, p = .94, 95% CI [-2.48 – 2.66]). However, consistent with our 
predictions, increasing levels of negative affect significantly predicted better Stop Signal 
performance for high reactive individuals in this condition (B = -2.95, SE = 1.31, t = -2.25, p = 
.03, 95% CI [-5.57 – -.33]; see Figure 3.3). 
These results support the hypothesis that negative mood would predict better inhibitory 
performance for those higher in reactivity and worse inhibitory performance for those lower in 
reactivity in the heuristic conditions. To ascertain whether our findings were attributable to 
negative mood enhancing analytic thinking in participants higher or lower in reactivity, thereby 
countering the heuristic manipulation, we returned to the Navon induction data and examined the 
trends of negative affect, emotional reactivity and the interaction of emotional reactivity and 
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negative affect on the residual of global RT controlling for local RT. The overall model predicted 
3.7% of the variance in induction effectiveness (R2 = .04, F [3, 77] = 2.24, p = .41). Neither 
Negative affect (B = -1.01, SE = 2.14, t < 1, p = .64, 95% CI [-5.28 – 3.25]), emotional reactivity 
(B = -.73, SE = .86, t < 1, p = .40, 95% CI [-2.43 – .98]), nor the interaction of emotional 
reactivity and negative affect (B = -4.02, SE = 12.89, t < 1, p = .76, 95% CI [-29.68 – 21.65]) 
significantly predicted global RT. These results were unchanged when difference scores (i.e., 
global RT – local RT) were analyzed.  
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Figure 3.3.  
Simple slopes demonstrating the regression of individual differences in negative affect on 
inhibitory performance moderated by emotional reactivity, with positive affect entered as a 
covariate.  
 
Negative mood and post-induction inhibitory performance in the analytic condition 
A similar hierarchical regression was used to test the hypothesis that negative affect 
would facilitate post-induction inhibitory performance (i.e., average SSRT across blocks 2 and 3) 
in the analytic condition. Overall, the model predicted 7.7% of the variance in Stop Signal 
performance (R2 = .08, F[4, 75] = 1.55, p = .20). Positive affect did not predict a significant 




















Low Reactivity Average Reactivity High Reactivity
 
49 
   
1.44]). Emotional reactivity and negative affect added 6.9% variance to the overall model (ΔR2 = 
.07, ΔF[2, 75] = 2.76, p =.07) with increased negative mood predicting better performance (B = -
2.70, SE = 1.21, t = -2.23 p = .03, 95% CI [-5.11 – -.28]), and no effect of emotional reactivity (B 
= .388, SE = .522, t < 1 p = .46, 95% CI [-.65 – 1.43]) within the analytic condition. As predicted 
there was no interaction within this condition (ΔR2 = .00, ΔF[1, 75] < 1, p =.58). 
These results support the hypothesis that negative mood would predict better inhibitory 
performance irrespective of emotional reactivity. To ascertain whether our findings were 
attributable to negative mood engendering a more analytic thinking style that was further 
enhanced through the analytic manipulation, we returned to the Navon induction data and 
examined the association of negative affect and local RT controlling for global RT. The overall 
model predicted 6.7% of the variance in induction effectiveness (R2 = .07, F [3, 74] = 1.76, p = 
.16). Neither Negative affect (B = 1.31, SE = 2.24, t < 1, p = .56, 95% CI [-3.15 – 5.77]), nor 
emotional reactivity (B = -.86, SE = .88, t < 1, p = .33, 95% CI [-2.60 – .89]) significantly 
predicted local RT, although there was a trend towards an interaction of emotional reactivity and 
negative affect (B = -25.36, SE = 12.95, t = -1.96, p = .05, 95% CI [-51.17 – .45]).  Within this 
interaction lower levels of negative affect had no relationship with performance across reactivity 
(B = .50, SE = 1.11, t < 1, p = .66, 95% CI [-1.71 – 2.70]).  There also was no effect for average 
levels of emotional reactivity (B = -.84, SE = .88, t < 1, p = .34, 95% CI [-2.60 – .92]). However, 
increasing levels of negative affect tended to predict better local RT performance as reactivity 
increased (B = -2.18, SE = 1.14, t = -1.91, p = .06, 95% CI [-4.45 – .09]). These results were 





   
3.4 Discussion 
Our study was undertaken to directly examine the potential impact of thinking styles on 
inhibitory performance. At the outset we expected that SSRTs would be faster in the analytic 
relative to heuristic conditions. Counter to what was predicted, we found that inhibitory 
performance was comparable across groups. Research has both supported and refuted the 
validity of Navon-like inductions for engendering these thinking styles (e.g., Klauer & 
Singmann, 2015; Majima, 2015). Although the forgoing may suggest that our induction was 
ineffective, our manipulation check suggests otherwise: participants were unequivocally faster 
on global trials in the heuristic condition and on local trials in the analytic condition. Another 
possibility is that analytic thinking is not beneficial for performing the Stop Signal task; 
however, this appears inconsistent with the significant findings we describe below. We suggest 
that a more parsimonious and plausible explanation of our null result is that comparison of 
groups obfuscated the effect of individual differences that were apparent upon examining SSRT 
within each condition. Other research has similarly demonstrated that while group level 
comparisons offer a more conservative and better controlled estimate of true effects, they reduce 
power of detecting true differences within the population of interest (Charness et al., 2012).  
Within the heuristic condition, we expected that emotional reactivity would moderate an 
association between negative mood and inhibitory performance. Consistent with this hypothesis 
and our prior work (Gabel & McAuley, 2018, 2020), highly reactive individuals performed better 
the more negative affect they were experiencing and less reactive individuals showed the 
opposite effect. Previously, we suggested that this interaction could be explained by the 
integration of two theoretical perspectives: affective certainty theory which postulates that trait-
inconsistent mood states interfere with task performance (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 
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2002) and cognitive load theory, which proposes that increased intensity of mood states will 
increase the likelihood of task unrelated thoughts and interfere with task performance (Curci et 
al., 2013; Seibert & Ellis, 1991). The integration of these two theories suggests that trait-
inconsistent moods will increase the likelihood of task-unrelated thoughts or active emotion 
regulation which will then interfere with performance on tasks of response inhibition. Findings 
from our previous work were also not inconsistent with mood-as-information theory, which 
posits that negative mood engenders analytic thinking that benefits tasks requiring close attention 
to detail (Bohner et al., 1994; Park & Banaji, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003). This led us to 
speculate that individuals higher in emotional reactivity, who are more accustomed to negative 
affect, might be able to better utilize a more analytic thinking style as they are less likely 
encumbered by cognitive load (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; 2020). Reflecting on our results in the 
heuristic condition of this study, we observed reactivity as a moderator of the association 
between negative affect and response inhibition such that individuals higher in reactivity 
performed better with increasing levels of negative affect while individuals lower in reactivity 
showed an opposing pattern. Across levels of reactivity, the pattern of results are consistent with 
affective certainty and cognitive load hypotheses which replicates previous findings (Gabel & 
McAuley, 2018; 2020; Tamir & Robinson, 2004). For individuals higher in reactivity these 
results are also consistent with research supporting a connection between negative affect and 
analytic thinking (Bless & Burger, 2017; Gasper & Clore 2002; Isbell et al., 2005; Srinivasan & 
Hanif, 2010). As identified by Bless and Burger (2017) positive mood is related to heuristic 
processing which relies more on pre-existing knowledge structures while negative mood 
promotes an analytic style which focuses more on situation-specific information. A novel task of 
response inhibition, such as the Stop Signal task, relies heavily on situation-specific information 
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(i.e., waiting for the beep) and therefore would likely benefit from an analytic thinking style 
promoted through increased negative affect as was observed for high-reactive individuals in the 
current study and in Gabel and McAuley (2018; 2020). Furthermore, several studies have noted 
that natural variations in mood are typically quite positive (Diener & Diener, 1996; Fredrickson 
& Brannigan, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Huntsinger et al., 2010) and that there is also a 
global/heuristic bias to processing information (Isbell et al., 2016; Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 1977; 
Oliva & Torralba, 2006). Accordingly, it is not surprising that there was a replication of the 
effects observed in Gabel & McAuley (2018) across levels of reactivity even with the addition of 
the heuristic induction. 
Within the analytic condition, we expected that negative affect would be the sole 
predictor of inhibitory performance irrespective of level of emotional reactivity. This hypothesis 
was supported by our findings and is consistent with our suggestion that pre-induction negative 
mood would engender an analytic thinking style, thereby strengthening the potency of the Navon 
induction for high-reactive individuals and countering some of the cognitive load that is more 
typically associated with negative mood for low-reactive individuals. In the latter, it may have 
been the case that the analytic induction helped to narrow their focus to local features in the task 
at hand, overriding the cognitive load that appears to be more typically associated with negative 
mood for these individuals (e.g., rumination; Brinker et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003). 
Thus, similar to what was observed by Schwarz and Clore (1983) the analytic induction might 
have shifted processing from internal issues (e.g., rumination, worry) to situation-specific 
information (e.g., identifying local features) which aided in subsequent response inhibitory 
performance. Additionally, as pointed out through Isbell and colleagues’ (Isbell et al., 2016; 
Isbell et al., 2013) affect-as-cognitive-feedback account, global or heuristic processing paired 
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with a negative response leads to a change in processing from global to local. Accordingly, 
another possibility is that for low-reactive individuals, error detection during the Stop Signal task 
does not typically elicit a strong negative arousal response which fails to switch to local 
processing unless individuals are primed to utilize an analytic thinking style. Conversely, high-
reactive individuals experience a negative arousal response to errors which primes or accentuates 
an analytic thinking style and improves inhibitory performance. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the complex interplay between affect and 
cognition by identifying thinking style as one of several likely mechanisms that explains why 
negative mood has the potential to help or hinder cognitive task performance. Our findings, 
though generally consistent with our predictions, should be interpreted within the context of 
several limitations to be addressed in future work. Others have suggested that a between-subjects 
research design might be suboptimal   for detecting differences in performance based on thinking 
style induction. We may have achieved null results due to increased between-subjects error and 
reduced power to detect effects (Charness et al., 2012). Also given that there are no obvious 
demand characteristics in the Navon induction, a within-subjects design would not have been 
inappropriate. Moreover, since thinking style inductions are thought to be short-lived and 
reversable (Huntsinger et al., 2010; 2014; Isbell et al., 2016), a superior design would be to have 
both heuristic and analytic conditions as within-subjects factors in a future study so long as the 
order of these conditions is counterbalanced. As a further consideration, future research might 
look at how discrete emotional responses to errors affect this relationship. As mentioned, the 
affect-as-cognitive-feedback model (Isbell et al., 2013; 2016) could help to explain how within-
task affective responses to errors paired with pre-existing mood states (i.e., positive or negative) 
might interact to predict performance differently based on differences in emotional reactivity. 
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The current study is limited in the sense that mood was only rated at baseline. Future studies 
might consider including mood checks during EF tasks to see how errors are affecting mood and 
subsequent performance. As a final consideration, future research should examine motivational 
and arousal information that might underly how positively or negatively valenced moods 
influence thinking style. Research has suggested that this information might be more important 
than emotional valence in determining thinking style (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2010b; Gable et al., 2015; Isbell et al., 2016; McKasy, 2020), a finding that has 




   
Chapter 4: The influence of affective and motivational states on response inhibition 
performance  
4.1 Introduction 
Purposeful behaviour in everyday life is facilitated by executive functions (EF), a 
collection of inter-related skills that allow us to consider multiple perspectives – including that of 
past, present and future – which help us to identify, evaluate, progress toward, and attain goals 
(Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). Although EF is comprised of myriad skills (Goldstein et al., 2014), 
response inhibition is widely viewed as central to the construct and has been conceptualized as 
the foundation upon which other executive skills develop (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Response 
inhibition refers to the cessation of naturally pre-potent or previously reinforced behaviours that 
are incompatible with a given goal (Nigg, 2017; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Resisting the 
customary behaviour of shaking someone’s hand during a pandemic would be a pertinent 
example of response inhibition. Because response inhibition is necessarily applied in situations 
that are novel, difficult, dangerous, require planning, and/or necessitate troubleshooting (e.g., 
Burgess, 2004), understanding contextual influences on inhibitory success is an important goal 
for research.  
Previous work in our lab has examined affective contributions to inhibitory control. By 
capitalizing on natural variations in mood (Gabel & McAuley, 2018) and experimentally 
inducing mood states (Gabel & McAuley, 2020), our work has demonstrated that negative affect 
has the potential to help or hinder inhibitory performance depending on one’s level of emotional 
reactivity. Emotional reactivity is defined as the rapidity, intensity, and duration of reactions to 
affective situations (Wheeler et al., 1993; Nock et al., 2008). We have consistently found that 
individuals lower in reactivity experience a decrement in inhibitory performance with increasing 
levels of negative affect, whereas individuals higher in reactivity typically demonstrate the 
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converse pattern. To explain this pattern of findings, we have hypothesized that individuals 
higher in reactivity may be less distracted by negative mood because they experience more 
frequent and long-lasting negative mood states (Compas et al., 2004; Howland et al., 2017) – that 
is when mood is trait-consistent performance improves. Moreover, theoretical accounts suggest 
that negative moods signify threat and engender a more analytic thinking style (e.g., Schwarz & 
Clore, 2003) but also have the potential to be cognitively depleting (e.g., Stahl et al., 2012). As 
such, it may be the case that individuals higher in reactivity use the informational significance of 
a negative mood to invest more attention into the task at hand whereas individuals lower in 
reactivity experience negative mood as trait-inconsistent and this mood causes cognitive load as 
they find their attention drawn toward distracting thoughts (e.g., rumination) or engaged in active 
emotion regulation (e.g., cognitive reappraisal) that interfere with task performance (Brinker et 
al., 2013; Curci et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003; Seibert & Ellis, 1991).  
While our work suggests that emotional valence is one factor that influences response 
inhibition and related executive skills, there is evidence from other work that EF may be 
differentially influenced by different high-arousal negative mood states. For example, research 
by Shields and colleagues (Shields et al., 2016) demonstrated that anxiety but not anger 
interfered with performance on a variant of the Wisconsin Card Sort Task – a classic 
neuropsychological measure of EF. The authors attributed their findings to different motivational 
systems activated by these two emotions. Motivation underlying affect has been identified as a 
vital component of emotion with approach and avoidance motivation systems being flagged for 
consideration above and beyond arousal and valence (Elliot et al., 2013; Gable et al., 2015; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2009; Harmon-Jones et al., 2013). In terms of discrete emotions, anger and 
anxiety both invoke a strong negatively valanced arousal response that potentiate one of three 
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different options for dealing with threat (Cannon, 1929). Anxiety typically involves avoidance of 
threat by freezing or actively fleeing, whereas anger more commonly entails approaching threat 
in order to nullify it. Because anxiety and anger tap into different motivational systems – 
avoidance and approach motivation, respectively – these emotions have the potential to affect 
our thinking and approach to problem solving in different ways (Bossuyt et al., 2014; Gable et 
al., 2015; Verbruggen & de Houwer, 2007). Taking this one step further, anger (approach-
motivation) may be more likely than anxiety (avoidance-motivation) to bolster response 
inhibition and related executive skills when used to facilitate goal-oriented behaviours (Bossuyt 
et al., 2014).  
While these two high arousal negative emotional states differ in underlying motivation 
and perhaps their impact on response inhibitory performance, it is interesting to consider how 
this relationship would be affected by emotional reactivity. The aforementioned studies in our 
lab suggest divergent predictions between high- and low-reactive individuals for negative affect 
generally speaking. Although we have yet to look at negative affective states with different 
underlying motivational systems, we have induced negative affect through remembering an 
upsetting event (e.g., doing poorly on a test; Gabel & McAuley, 2020) which is more likely be in 
line with avoidance-motivation. Accordingly, we might expect individuals low in reactivity to be 
more highly affected by anxiety (avoidance-motivated) via cognitive load, whereas anger 
(approach-motivation) might bolster response inhibition regardless of individual differences in 
emotional reactivity. 
The current study aims to replicate and extend the findings of Shields and colleagues 
(2016) by examining whether anger and anxiety interact with emotional reactivity to influence 
inhibitory performance. Although both emotions are negative in valence and high in arousal, we 
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anticipate that induction of anger will activate the approach-motivation system whereas 
induction of anxiety will activate the avoidant-motivation system. We also include induction of 
boredom, which is a low arousal, approach-oriented emotional experience that signals an 
individual to change their state or become engaged with something interesting (Bench & Lench, 
2013). While it shares some similarities with anger in that it is typically approach oriented, it 
differs in that it tends to broaden rather than narrow cognitive scope (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2010b; Gasper & Middlewood, 2014). Consistent with Shields et al. (2016) we expect that 
inhibitory performance will be best in the anger condition, worst in the anxiety condition, and 
intermediate in the boredom condition. Based on previous research in our lab (McAuley & 
Gabel, 2018; 2020), we further anticipate that emotional reactivity will predict improved 
inhibitory performance differently for those higher and lower in reactivity. Specifically, we 
expect that individuals lower in reactivity will perform best in the anger condition and worst in 
the anxiety condition while individuals higher in reactivity will perform similarly across 
conditions. Additionally, it is expected that individual differences in negative affect in the 
anxiety condition will affect performance negatively with increasing levels, while increasing 
experience of negative affect in the anger condition should affect performance positively.  
4.2 Methods 
Participants  
Participants were recruited through a departmental pool of students enrolled in 
psychology courses at the University of Waterloo. Power was determined through G*Power 
(Faul et al., 2009) software based on the average effect size of emotional reactivity, negative 
affect and their interaction on response inhibition (R2 =.089; Gabel & McAuley, 2020 and a 
study by Shields et al. (2016) predicting differences between anger, anxiety and neutral 
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conditions on response inhibition (partial eta2 =.10). Based on this model we expected a medium 
effect size f = .25 with α = .05 and β = .80 and estimated that at least 55 participants would be 
needed in each condition (N=165). One-hundred seventy-six undergraduates completed a 30-
minute experimental procedure for course credit (Mage = 20.10 years, SD = 2.25 years, 86% 
female, 30% Caucasian, 26% East Asian, 20% Other).  
Measures 
    Brief Emotional Circumplex (BEC). This 20-item in-house scale was developed and 
utilized instead of more traditional emotion scale (e.g., PANAS) to get information about 
specific emotion adjectives (i.e., anger, boredom) while maintaining a similar emotion structure 
to the PANAS. The scale asked participants to rate their current experience of 10 positive 
emotional adjectives (e.g., motivated, tranquil) and 8 negative emotional adjectives (e.g. angry, 
anxious) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very slightly or not at all (1) to extremely (5). 
Two ‘neutral’ emotions (i.e., tired and bored) were included as a manipulation check for the 
boredom condition. Responses were averaged within the positive and negative subscales, which 
were internally consistent in our sample (positive affect: baseline α = .85, post-induction α = .89, 
post-task α = .84; negative affect: baseline α = .79, post-induction α = .80, post-task α = .84).  
Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS; Nock et al., 2008). Participants rated their reactions to 21 
items using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from not at all like me (0) to completely like me (4). 
Items reflected emotional sensitivity (e.g., “my feelings get hurt easily”), emotional persistence 
(e.g., “when something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about for a long time”), and 
emotional arousal/intensity (e.g., “when I experience emotions I feel them very 
strongly/intensely”), which were averaged to create a mean score (M = 1.58, SD = .81, 
Cronbach’s α = .95). 
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Stop Signal Task (Logan et al., 1984). Participants made a speeded choice key press 
response to a centrally presented stimulus (i.e., a pink or yellow star) except when the stimulus 
was followed by an auditory signal that cued them to cancel their response. Timing of this 
auditory signal (i.e., the stop signal), referred to as the stop signal delay (SSD), was initially set 
to 250 ms post-stimulus onset for all participants. The SSD was subsequently adjusted based on 
each participant’s response on the preceding stop trial: SSD was increased by 50 ms following a 
failure to inhibit and was decreased by 50 ms following a successful inhibit. Because timing of 
the SSD influences the likelihood of inhibitory success, having this dynamic tracking algorithm 
calibrated to each individual participant ensured that they were able to successfully inhibit their 
responses on approximately half of stop trials (see also Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 2003). 
The task was presented in four blocks that each included 8 (25%) stop trials and 24 (75%) go 
trials. Stop signal reaction time (SSRT) was calculated in ms as the mean SSD subtracted from 
the average time taken to correctly respond on non ‘stop’ trials (M = 347.50, SD = 67.37, 
Cronbach’s α = .96). 
Demographic Questionnaire. Included were questions regarding age, sex, ethnicity, and 
medical history. 
Procedure 
All participants completed tasks in the same fixed order. They first completed the Emotion 
Reactivity Scale and Brief Emotional Circumplex (BEC) scale. As per the mood induction in 
Shields et al., (2016), participants were then randomly assigned to a condition in which they 
were instructed to spend 5-minutes writing about a recent event that made them feel anxious 
(anxiety condition, n = 58), angry (anger condition, n = 59), or in which they wrote letters of the 
English alphabet in alphabetical order (boredom condition, n = 59) (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 
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1994; Moons & Shields, 2015; Shields et al., 2016; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The boredom 
condition was adapted to match the timing of the other two conditions while introducing a face-
valid task to induce boredom. Participants then completed a post-induction BEC, the Stop Signal 
task, a post-task BEC, and then the demographic questionnaire. 
4.3 Results 
Data Cleaning and Normality Analyses 
All analyses were completed using SPSS version 26. The Stop Signal task program 
crashed for two participants who were subsequently removed from analysis. Another two 
participants were excluded from analysis because they did not follow task instructions (i.e., 
responded in under 100ms on average for go trials, or were overly cautious resulting in less than 
10% correct go trials). Four participants reported not being activated by the emotional writing 
induction task (anxiety, n = 3, anger, n = 1) and were removed from analysis. 
Scores on a composite of post-induction and post-task negative affect in both the 
boredom and anger conditions violated assumptions of normality for skew and kurtosis 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov p < .001). A log transformed version of this composite improved 
normality of the distribution in both the boredom (D = .202 to D = .154) and anger (D = .173 to 
D = .130) conditions; however, the p-value in both conditions remained below .05 so the non-log 
transformed negative affect composite was used for the following analyses. Response times from 
the Stop Signal task and all other self-report measures were within reasonable limits of normality 
(i.e., 95% CI of skew and kurtosis <1.96, Kolmogorov-Smirnov p > .05). There were 10 
multivariate outliers observed in the dataset (anxiety, n = 4, anger, n =3, boredom, n = 3). These 
participants were removed from subsequent analyses. The final sample of 158 participants 
included 55 participants in the boredom condition, 52 participants in the anger condition and 51 
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in the anxiety condition. The pattern of results was unchanged by inclusion of the full sample or 
use of the log transformed negative affect variable. 
Group Differences and Manipulation Check 
 First, a one-way ANOVA was used to ensure that participants did not differ on emotional 
reactivity, or baseline levels of positive and negative affect between conditions. Results indicated 
no group differences on these variables (p’s > .34). Next, paired samples t-tests were analyzed as 
a check to see if positive mood was significantly higher than negative mood at baseline across 
conditions. As expected, positive mood was significantly higher than negative affect at baseline 
in the anger (t [51] = -10.36 p < .001), anxiety (t [50] = -9.77 p < .001) and boredom 
conditions (t [54] = -10.85 p < .001). Participants averaged 1.4 on the negative affect subscale 
(i.e., very little/a little) and 2.5 on the positive affect subscale (i.e., a little/moderately). 
Correlational analyses were done to confirm that emotional reactivity was correlated with 
baseline negative, but not positive mood across conditions. Results support this hypothesis with 
emotional reactivity related to negative (r [158] = .40, p < .001) but not positive mood (r [158] = 
-.02, p =.77) at baseline. There was no difference in the magnitude of these correlations across 
conditions for positive affect (anger condition: r [52] = -.13, p =.37; boredom condition: r [55] = 
-.01, p =.92; anxiety condition: r [51] = .04, p =.79) or negative affect (anger condition: r [52] = 
.44, p < .01; boredom condition: r [55] = .41, p < .0; anxiety condition: r [51] = .36, p < .01). 
Applying a Fisher’s r-z transformation confirms that the correlation between emotional reactivity 
and negative and positive affect were of significantly different magnitude overall (z = 3.91, p < 
.01) or within conditions (anger: z = 2.98, p < .01; boredom: z = 2.27, p = .01; anxiety: z = 1.65, 
p = .05). 
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Next, paired samples t-tests of boredom, anger, anxiety and a composite of positive affect 
from the BEC were used to test the effectiveness of the manipulation within each condition. As 
predicted boredom increased significantly in the boredom condition (t [53] = -4.66, p < .01). 
There was no significant change in anger in this condition (t [54] = 1.35, p = .18); however, 
anxiety (t [54] = 3.81, p < .01) and positive affect (t [54] = 6.79, p < .01) decreased significantly 
from baseline. In the anger condition, anger increased significantly (t [51] = -9.81, p < .01). 
There was no significant change in anxiety (t [51] = -1.46, p = .15) but boredom (t [51] = 2.83, p 
< .01) and positive affect (t [51] = 2.78, p < .01) demonstrated a decreasing trend. Within the 
anxiety condition, anxiety increased significantly (t [50] = -6.51, p < .01). Interestingly, anger 
increased (t [50] = -4.41, p < .01) as well, while boredom (t [50] = 4.30, p < .01) and positive 
affect decreased significantly (t [50] = 4.07, p < .01) in this condition. Change in negative and 
positive affect from baseline to post-induction did not differ on the basis of emotional reactivity 
in the boredom (p’s >.170), anger (p’s > .15) or anxiety (p’s > .18) mood induction conditions. 
A follow-up one-way ANOVA was analyzed to determine if post-induction positive 
affect, boredom, anger and anxiety differed between conditions. Utilizing a Tukey HSD test it 
was found that boredom was significantly higher in the boredom condition than in the anger (p < 
.01) and anxiety (p < .01) conditions but no different between the anxiety and anger conditions (p 
= .98). Similarly, anger was significantly higher in the anger condition than in the anxiety (p < 
.01) and boredom (p < .01) conditions. Anger was also significantly higher in the anxiety 
condition than in the boredom condition (p < .01). Anxiety was significantly higher in the 
anxiety condition than in the boredom (p < .01) and anger conditions (p < .01). There was no 
significant difference in anxiety between the anger and boredom conditions, although the anger 
condition had a trend towards having more anxiety (p = .09). There were no significant 
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differences between the anger and boredom (p = .56), boredom and anxiety (p = .96), or anger 
and anxiety (p = .73) conditions on positive affect (see Figure 4.1 for post-induction mood 
scores).  Results indicate that our procedure elicited the intended mood state in the boredom and 
anger conditions, while the anxiety condition increased the experience of anxiety as well as 
anger. Additionally, the degree to which this mood state was induced did not differ based on 
level of emotional reactivity. 
 
Figure 4.1. Change in ratings of anger, boredom, anxiety and positive affect from baseline to 
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Figure 4.2. Post-induction affect ratings of anger, anxiety, boredom and positive affect 
compared across anxiety, anger and boredom conditions. Error bars represent +/- 2 standard 




 Effect of condition on response inhibition 
 A one-way ANOVA was used to test whether performance on the Stop Signal task 
differed as a function of condition. A priori contrasts involved comparison of the anxiety 
condition to the anger condition and secondary and tertiary contrasts that compared the boredom 
to anger and boredom to anxiety conditions. Levene’s test revealed homogeneity of variance in 
SSRT across conditions. Neither the difference between the anxiety and anger condition (t [155] 
= -1.68, p = .10) nor the differences between the boredom and anxiety conditions (t [155] = 1.12, 
p = .26) or boredom and anger conditions (t [155] = -.58, p = .56) were significant, although 
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for descriptives). Overall the effect of condition on Stop Signal performance explained 1.8% of 
the variance (R2 = .02, F[1, 156] = 2.82, p = .10).  
 Emotional reactivity as a moderator 
When emotional reactivity was added as a moderator and positive affect was included as 
a covariate, 6.7% of the variance in Stop Signal performance was explained by the model (R2 = 
.07, F[7, 150] = 1.54, p = .16).  
 
Figure 4.3. Effect of negative mood condition using emotional reactivity as a moderator with 























   
Individual differences analysis 
 Next, we explored whether individual differences in negative affect influenced SSRT in 
the entire sample. Positive affect and emotional reactivity were added into the model as 
covariates at step one. The negative affect and dummy coded mood condition using anxiety as 
the reference group were added in step two and the interactions of dummy coded conditions with 
negative affect were entered at step three. The overall model accounted for 12.3% of the variance 
in SSRT (R2 = .12, F [7, 150] = 3.01, p < .01). Positive affect and emotional reactivity did not 
explain a significant amount of variance at step one (R2 = .03, F [2, 155] = 2.47, p = .09). At step 
two, dummy coded anger and boredom and negative affect did not add a significant amount of 
variance (ΔR2 = .02, ΔF [3, 152] = 1.05, p = .37); however, the interaction terms between 
dummy coded anger and boredom and negative affect added a significant amount of variance to 
the model at step three (ΔR2 = .07, ΔF [2, 150] = 6.20, p < .01). Herein, the interaction of the 
anger condition with negative affect was significant (B = -45.30, SE = 16.04, t = -2.83, p < .01, 
95% CI [-76.89 – -13.61]) while the interaction of the boredom condition with negative affect 
was not (B = 7.03, SE = 17.34, t < 1, p = .69, 95% CI [-27.23 – 41.29]).3 
Using PROCESS version 3.4 (Hayes, 2014), simple slopes for the regression of negative 
affect on SSRT were tested for the anxiety and anger condition. In the anger condition, 
increasing negative affect was associated with faster SSRTs (B = -22.95, SE = 10.29, t = -2.23, p 
= .03, 95% CI [-43.37 – -2.53]). An opposing pattern of negative affect on performance was 
evident in the anxiety condition (B = 24.18, SE = 12.36, t = 1.96, p = .05, 95% CI [-.35 – -48.70]; 
see Figure 4.4). These results suggest that individuals are performing significantly better in the 
anger condition than the anxiety condition with increasing levels of negative affect. 
 
3 Model with log-transformed negative affect: R2 = .13, F [7, 150] = 3.20, p < .01. 
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Figure 4.4. Effect of performance between the anger and anxiety conditions with negative affect 
as a predictor and positive affect and emotional reactivity as covariates. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This study was undertaken to examine how specific emotional states, varying in 
motivation, would potentially interact with emotional reactivity to influence inhibitory 
performance. Contrary to expectation, response inhibition was statistically comparable across the 
anger (high-arousal approach-motivation), anxiety (high-arousal avoidant-motivation), and 
boredom (low-arousal approach-motivation) conditions. While we were unable to provide a strict 
replication of Shields et al. (2016) between conditions, our individual differences analysis 
suggests that higher levels of negative affect predict performance differently between the two 
conditions that models the fan interaction in Shields and colleagues (2016). In this current study, 




















   
anxiety condition performed worse as negative affect increased. Given our prediction that anger 
and anxiety should be high arousal conditions, this pattern of findings makes sense: increasing 
levels of negative affect may activate motivational systems (approach vs. avoidance) and have 
disparate effects on performance across conditions. Overall, these results provide partial support 
for motivational and arousal accounts regarding the relationship between emotion and EF. 
Avoidance motivated arousal has been considered to be more cognitive and physiologically 
taxing than approach motivated arousal (Roskes et. al., 2013) and thus it may be that cognitive 
load is higher under conditions of avoidance motivation. Conversely, it may be that approach 
motivation signalled through emotions such as anger might lead to a push towards task 
engagement that utilizes an analytic thinking style that is beneficial for tasks of response 
inhibition. Future research could examine this latter proposition by looking at the effects of anger 
on EF tasks that are proposed to be benefitted via a heuristic thinking style such as creativity. If 
effects divergent with tasks of creativity it would be suggestive that anger engenders an analytic 
thinking style whereas if effects were similar to what was found in the current study, it would be 
indicative that approach motivation, as opposed to the underlying thinking style, that is helpful in 
task performance. 
An alternative mediating mechanism that could explain our pattern of results comes from 
the devaluation-by-inhibition hypothesis (De Vito et al., 2018). This theory suggests that 
negative affect is utilized in response inhibition such that to-be-inhibited stimuli are found to be 
devalued compared to other stimuli that are fixated on (De Vito et al., 2018; Driscoll et al., 2018; 
Fenske & Eastwood, 2003, Fenske & Raymond, 2006, Fenske et al., 2005; Raymond et al., 
2005). Thus, it is possible that negative affect may be utilized to improve response inhibition via 
the Stop Signal task if this affective state is directed towards the stimulus to be inhibited (i.e., 
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when it is approach motivated). Future research could induce angry (approach) and anxious 
(avoidant) mood states and observe whether those in the anger condition devalue the to-be-
inhibited stimuli more than those in the anxious condition. This would provide evidence to 
support motivational models and the importance of negative affect in response inhibition. 
Additionally, future research looking at natural variations in mood could examine how individual 
differences in emotional reactivity or neuroticism differ in their devaluation of the to-be-
inhibited stimuli. Emotionally reactive and neurotic individuals are associated with increased 
experience of negative affect and based on findings supporting the affective certainty and 
cognitive load hypotheses through natural variations in mood (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; Tamir 
& Robinson, 2004) it might be predicted that these individuals would devalue the to-be-inhibited 
stimuli more than those lower in reactivity. 
Interestingly, in the current study emotional reactivity and its interaction with negative 
mood condition did not predict a significant amount of variance above and beyond condition 
alone. These results fail to support the affective certainty model (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; 
Tamir et al., 2002) that has been supported in previous research in our lab (Gabel & McAuley, 
2018; 2020), although they are not in opposition to this model either. The pattern of results was 
in the expected direction and between group differences may just have a smaller effect size than 
we had originally predicted.  
Another interesting finding regarding emotional reactivity in the current study is that 
change in negative affect was not related, positively or negatively, to emotional reactivity. Given 
that emotional reactivity is said to be related to the intensity of reactions to emotional situations 
it would be logical to think that emotional reactivity would be associated with a larger increase in 
negative affect through the mood induction. While inconsistent at a conceptual level, this finding 
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is consistent with previous results indicating no relationship between change in negative affect 
and emotional reactivity after a negative mood induction (Gabel & McAuley, 2020). It is 
difficult to postulate why a lack of effect is present other than to suggest that perhaps emotional 
reactivity refers more to negative emotional persistence rather than the intensity of emotional 
experience. 
Overall, the current study, whilst unable to provide a full replication of Shields and 
colleagues (2016) findings, provides some confirmatory evidence that motivational information 
informed by increased negative arousal is important for understanding the relationship between 
emotion and response inhibition. Conversely, past studies have found support for the affective 
certainty model through individual differences factors such as neuroticism (Tamir & Robinson, 
2004) and emotional reactivity (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; 2020) which lead to diverging 
predictions in how emotion affects response inhibition depending on what is affectively normal 





   
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Response inhibition is a foundational executive functioning skill, which involves 
withholding responses that are pre-potent yet inappropriate within a particular goal-context. To 
date, its relationship with emotion has been largely explored through emotional valence and 
existing studies have failed to find consistent support for cognitive load, mood-as-information, or 
motivational models. The presented research provides evidence for a model of emotion that 
incorporates the aforementioned models by utilizing affective certainty theory (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2004) which identifies that individual differences in the experience of emotion will 
moderate how negative affect effects response inhibition performance. Emotional reactivity is 
presented as an important individual differences factor that is identified by more frequent, 
intense and long-lasting negative mood states (Nock et al., 2008). Results generally supported 
the affective certainty and cognitive load models, although there is some evidence supporting the 
mood-as-information and motivational models as well.  
Chapter 2 built upon my Masters work which found a moderating effect of emotional 
reactivity on the relationship between negative affect and response inhibition such that 
individuals lower in reactivity tended to perform worse the more negative affect they 
experienced and individuals higher in reactivity showed the opposite effect (Gabel & McAuley, 
2018). Chapter 2 expanded upon this by inducing negative or positive mood states through a 
memory-based mood induction. Results supported findings from Gabel and McAuley (2018) 
with individuals higher in reactivity performing better with increasing negative affect and 
individuals lower in reactivity exhibiting an opposing pattern. Moreover, individuals higher in 
reactivity performed similarly across positive and negative conditions while individuals lower in 
reactivity performed significantly worse in the negative mood condition. The performance 
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decrement by individuals lower in reactivity is congruous with both the affective certainty 
(Tamir & Robinson, 2004; Tamir et al., 2002) and cognitive load theories (Seibert & Ellis, 
1991), which propose that negative moods might introduce cognitive interference that gets in the 
way of task performance for individuals who do not typically experience negative mood. 
Conversely, the facilitative effect demonstrated by individuals higher in reactivity is consistent 
with both the affective certainty and mood-as-information theories (Schwarz and Clore, 2003). 
As these individuals are generally more familiar with negative mood, negative affect does not 
introduce cognitive load and a more analytic information processing style which is engendered 
by negative affect may be utilized to improve performance. However, we did not manipulate or 
measure thinking style in this study and as such our explanation for those higher in reactivity 
accessing an analytic thinking style is speculative. 
Accordingly, Chapter 3 explored how different information processing styles, analytic 
and heuristic, might add to our understanding of how negative affect and emotional reactivity 
interact to predict response inhibition. Results obtained from this study were mixed where 
individuals in the analytic condition did not demonstrate better performance than those in the 
heuristic condition. However, an interesting pattern was observed within each condition where 
there was a replication of the finding from Gabel and McAuley (2018) in the heuristic condition 
such that individuals higher in reactivity performed better with increased negative affect and 
individuals lower in reactivity exhibited the opposite pattern. Research has demonstrated that 
individuals typically experience positive mood and generally adopt a more heuristic information 
processing style (Diener & Diener, 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002) and thus the replication of the 
interactive effect within this condition makes sense as the induction would generally be 
consistent with the information processing style of most individuals at baseline. Conversely, in 
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the analytic condition individuals tended to perform better with increasing levels of negative 
affect regardless of emotional reactivity. Negative emotions are related to less heuristic thinking 
and a more analytic information processing style (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Rodriguez-Gomez et 
al., 2019; Smith et al., 2014) and it is plausible that negative mood in the analytic condition may 
have strengthened the induction to aid in response inhibition across individuals. 
Chapter 4 added to this line of work by examining how different motivational systems 
underlying discrete negative affective states influenced response inhibition. A study by Shields 
and colleagues (2016) had found that approach and avoidance motivated negative emotions, 
anger and anxiety respectively, influenced EF performance in divergent ways such that anxiety 
impaired EF while anger did not. Chapter 4 aimed to replicate findings from this study while 
adding in the contribution of emotional reactivity to this relationship. Results were unable to 
replicate findings from Shields et al.’s (2016) original experiment, although degree of negative 
affect influenced anger and anxiety conditions in opposing ways. Increased negative affect 
predicted improved performance in the negative mood condition while demonstrating the 
opposite effect in the anxiety condition consistent with what was observed in Shields and 
colleagues (2016) experiment. Counter to our predictions, there was no significant effect of an 
interaction between emotional reactivity and negative affect condition, although trends were 
again in the same direction as our hypothesis.  
Across the chapters presented in this dissertation is the finding that performance on the 
Stop Signal task is not impaired by the experience of negative affect and was in many instances 
improved by increasing levels of negative affect. A potential insight that might speak to why 
negative affect is not detrimental for those higher in reactivity, and may in fact facilitate 
performance under certain conditions, comes from the devaluation-by-inhibition hypothesis. 
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Fenske and collaborators (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Fenske & Raymond, 2006; Raymond et 
al., 2005) have posited that while emotion influences attention, attention also influences emotion. 
A finding that has been repeatedly demonstrated is that individuals make affective devaluations 
of inhibited stimuli. Support for these findings have been extended to social-emotional 
devaluations of trustworthiness, sexual arousal, and valence of inhibited information (De Vito et 
al., 2018; Driscoll et al., 2018; Fenske et al., 2005). These converging lines of evidence support 
the devaluation-by-inhibition hypothesis which suggests that negative affect is related to and 
important in inhibiting a response (De Vito et al., 2017). This lends some potential insight into 
the evolutionarily adaptive purpose of negative affect in the inhibition of environmental 
information which posits that conflict between a pre-potent response and an adaptive but novel 
response requires some devaluation of the pre-potent response to favour a novel response that 
might be adaptive given the situation (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). In other words, one must 
ignore a heuristic response in favor of an untrained or novel response. An emotion-focused 
approach to signify a need for change via statistical learning would be to devalue the to-be-
inhibited stimulus until the heuristic changes to a more adaptive one. While results from this 
dissertation and Gabel & McAuley (2018) are not incongruous with this account, there is 
currently no known research supporting this conjecture. Future research could examine the 
devaluation-by-inhibition hypothesis jointly with mood and emotion reactivity research such that 
differences in degree of devaluation of the to-be-inhibited stimulus are observed across 
emotional reactivity and experience of negative affect. 
The studies presented in this dissertation provide evidence that individuals higher in 
reactivity are typically better able to utilize negative affect effectively in adapting to a novel task 
involving response inhibition. Consistent with Tamir and colleagues (Tamir & Robinson, 2004; 
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Tamir et al., 2002) affective certainty model, it is likely that high reactive individuals are not 
influenced by negative affect in a detrimental way because negative moods are trait-consistent 
for them. This trait-consistency has the potential to alleviate cognitive load that might come in 
the form of health promoting but task irrelevant emotion regulation (Curci et al., 2013; John & 
Gross, 2004) or ambivalence of attentional deployment (Nelson et al., 2015). Because they might 
engage less in active emotion regulatory techniques or utilize less ambivalent strategies for 
attentional deployment, individuals higher in reactivity might be able to utilize analytic thinking 
provided through negative affect and devalue the pre-potent response more effectively than low 
reactive individuals leading to improved response inhibition. A major limitation of the current 
line of research is that attentional strategies and emotion regulation were not assessed. Future 
research should focus on elucidating the relationship between the utilization of emotion 
regulation and attentional strategies and emotional reactivity during cognitive tasks. 
Relatedly, another limitation of the work presented in this dissertation is that the chosen 
conceptualization of emotional reactivity refers specifically to negative emotional reactivity and 
is not considered in relation to emotion regulation or distress tolerance. More recent 
conceptualizations of emotional reactivity have suggested that facets of both negative and 
positive emotional reactivity can be measured and that these two facets share a mild negative 
relationship (Becerra & Campitelli, 2013; Becerra et al., 2019). Future research might also 
consider positive emotional reactivity as a pertinent individual differences factor that might 
moderate the relationship between affect and response inhibition. Additionally, negative 
emotional reactivity has been related to emotion dysregulation and specifically to perceived 
limitations in implementing effective emotion regulation strategies (Becerra et al., 2019). As the 
particular emotion regulation strategies utilized by high reactive individuals remain unspecified, 
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it would be important for future research to determine how individuals higher in negative 
emotional reactivity differ in their emotion regulation strategy use. It would be particularly 
interesting to explore if there are differences in long-term (e.g., cognitive reappraisal) vs. short-
term effectiveness (e.g., expressive suppression) of emotion regulation strategy use and how 
these differences affect cognitive load and response inhibition performance. Furthermore, recent 
research by Bruns and colleagues (Bruns et al., 2019) has provided evidence that emotional 
reactivity is negatively related to distress tolerance above and beyond the experience of negative 
affect. Distress tolerance refers to an individual’s ability to withstand unpleasant emotional 
experiences. It is similar to negative emotional reactivity in that it is related to emotional distress 
and distinct in that it includes aspects of emotional acceptance and regulation of negative affect 
(Simons & Gaher, 2005). Accordingly, distress tolerance incorporates aspects of emotional 
reactivity and emotion regulation and future research might consider utilizing this construct as a 
further individual differences factor influencing the relationship between affect and response 
inhibition.  
Additionally, it is important to note that psychopathology has been shown to hinder 
performance on cognitive tasks (Epp et al., 2012, Joormann et al., 2011) and given that 
emotional reactivity is highly related to psychopathology (Thake & Zelenski, 2013; Wei et al., 
2005) it is important to address how the current line of research might replicate in  a clinical 
sample. It is plausible that our sample might represent an ‘optimal zone’ of reactivity that is not 
indicative of psychopathology and as such increased negative affect and arousal might be 
utilized effectively within this population. Given our model of emotion it might be expected that 
a clinical sample would be especially hindered by depression which lowers arousal making it 
more difficult for individuals to engage in the task effectively (Grahek et al., 2018). As 
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mentioned, research has also demonstrated that emotion dysregulation such as rumination which 
is commonly persistent amongst depressed individuals also presents cognitive load which will 
further interfere with tasks of response inhibition (Curci et al., 2013; Joormann et al., 2011).  
 Conversely, it can be seen how extremely high levels of arousal involved in emotions 
such as terror, rage or euphoria would also lead to task interference. Our results for reactivity and 
affective intensity make sense in the context of naturally occurring and induced mood with mild 
to moderate arousal. However, one might expect that moods high in arousal would result in 
emotional flooding and have the opposite effect of what we observed. In the current samples, 
inductions did not seem to affect high reactive individuals to a greater degree than low reactive 
individuals and accordingly, it is likely that the limited mood inductions that can be achieved in 
the context of a lab experiment are not representative of real-life situations where much higher 
arousal might be present. 
Although laboratory experiments do not perfectly reflect conditions of everyday life, the 
task demands of the Stop Signal task – to stop a response that is naturally pre-potent – are 
reflective of many real-life situations. For example, running from first base to second base when 
the ball is hit (i.e., the go stimulus) before knowing whether the ball will be caught (i.e., the stop 
signal). Testing response inhibition in a lab-setting where the consequences of failure to inhibit 
might be much less than in the natural environment might not draw attention to failures of 
response inhibition. Thus, limitations to the ecological validity of the Stop Signal paradigm are 
most evident in underrepresenting consequences to failures of response inhibition. 
 Overall, the work presented in this dissertation contributes a more nuanced understanding 
of how emotional valence, motivation and related information processing styles relate to 
response inhibition. Emotional reactivity emerged as a key component, speaking for what is 
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emotionally trait-consistent at the individual level. This construct was a significant moderator of 
the relationship between negative affect and response inhibition performance which supported 
the affective certainty and cognitive load hypotheses. When information processing was 
manipulated to be more analytic and when underlying motivation was manipulated to be more 
approach-oriented this moderating relationship was unobservable and the primary predictor of 
improved performance was increased negative affect. These results suggest that negative affect is 
quite likely essential for response inhibition; however, the degree to which negative affect allows 
for effective inhibition might depend on how we typically experience negative emotions and 
what motivational information provided through negative emotions tell us.  
 
80 
   
References 
Albert, J., López-Martín, S., & Carretié, L. (2010). Emotional context modulates response 
inhibition: Neural and behavioral data. Neuroimage, 49(1), 914-921. 
Alexander, J. K., Hillier, A., Smith, R. M., Tivarus, M. E., & Beversdorf, D. Q. (2007). Beta-
adrenergic modulation of cognitive flexibility during stress. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 19(3), 468-478. 
Alvarez, J. A., & Emory, E. (2006). Executive function and the frontal lobes: A meta-analytic 
review. Neuropsychology Review, 16(1), 17-42. 
Augustine, A. A., Larsen, R. J., & Lee, H. (2013). Affective personality traits and cognition: 
Interactions between extraversion/neuroticism, affect, and cognition. In M. D. Robinson, 
E. Watkins, & E. Harmon-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (p. 312–
328). Guilford Press. 
Baddeley, A. (1992). Working memory. Science, 255(5044), 556-559. 
Banich, M. T. (2009). Executive function: The search for an integrated account. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 18(2), 89-94. 
Bar, M. (2009). A cognitive neuroscience hypothesis of mood and depression. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 13(11), 456-463. 
Baer, R. A., & Sauer, S. E. (2011). Relationships between depressive rumination, anger 
rumination, and borderline personality features. Personality Disorders: Theory, 
Research, and Treatment, 2(2), 142-150. 
Barrett, L. F., & Bar, M. (2009). See it with feeling: Affective predictions during object 
perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 364(1521), 1325-1334. 
 
81 
   
Becerra, R., & Campitelli, G. (2013). Emotional reactivity: Critical analysis and proposal of a 
new scale. International Journal of Applied Psychology, 3(6), 161-168. 
Becerra, R., Preece, D., Campitelli, G., & Scott-Pillow, G. (2019). The assessment of emotional 
reactivity across negative and positive emotions: Development and validation of the Perth 
Emotional Reactivity Scale (PERS). Assessment, 26(5), 867-879. 
Bell, M. A., & Fox, N. A. (1992). The relations between frontal brain electrical activity and 
cognitive development during infancy. Child Development, 63(5), 1142-1163. 
Bench, S. W., & Lench, H. C. (2013). On the function of boredom. Behavioral sciences, 3(3), 
459-472. 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24(1), 45-62. 
Bohner, G., Chaiken, S., & Hunyadi, P. (1994). The role of mood and message ambiguity in the 
interplay of heuristic and systematic processing. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24(1), 207-221. 
Bossuyt, E., Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2014). On angry approach and fearful avoidance: The 
goal-dependent nature of emotional approach and avoidance tendencies. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 118-124. 
Boyes, M. E., Clarke, P. J., & Hasking, P. A. (2020). Relationships between dispositional and 
experimentally elicited emotional reactivity, intensity, and perseveration. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 152, 109573. 
Brinker, J. K., Campisi, M., Gibbs, L., & Izzard, R. (2013). Rumination, mood and cognitive 
performance. Psychology, 4(03), 224-231. 
 
82 
   
Bruns, K. M., O'Bryan, E. M., & McLeish, A. C. (2019). An examination of the association 
between emotion reactivity and distress tolerance among college students. The Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 207(6), 429-432. 
Bunce, D., Handley, R., & Gaines Jr, S. O. (2008). Depression, anxiety, and within-person 
variability in adults aged 18 to 85 years. Psychology and Aging, 23(4), 848-858. 
Burgess, P. W. (2004). Theory and methodology in executive function research. In Methodology 
of frontal and executive function (pp. 87-121). Routledge. 
Burgoon, E. M., Henderson, M. D., & Markman, A. B. (2013). There are many ways to see the 
forest for the trees: A tour guide for abstraction. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 8(5), 501-520. 
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Organization for physiological homeostasis. Physiological reviews, 9(3), 
399-431. 
Charbonneau, A. M., Mezulis, A. H., & Hyde, J. S. (2009). Stress and emotional reactivity as 
explanations for gender differences in adolescents’ depressive symptoms. Journal of 
Youth and Adolescence, 38(8), 1050-1058. 
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Kuhn, M. A. (2012). Experimental methods: Between-subject and 
within-subject design. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1), 1-8. 
Clore, G. L., & Huntsinger, J. R. (2007). How emotions inform judgment and regulate 
thought. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(9), 393-399. 
Compas, B. E., Connor-Smith, J., & Jaser, S. S. (2004). Temperament, stress reactivity, and 
coping: Implications for depression in childhood and adolescence. Journal of Clinical 
Child and Adolescent Psychology, 33(1), 21-31. 
 
83 
   
Corr, P. J. (2004). Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 28(3), 317-332. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Csikszentmihalyi, I. S. (Eds.). (1992). Optimal experience: 
Psychological studies of flow in consciousness. Cambridge University Press. 
Curci, A., Lanciano, T., Soleti, E., & Rimé, B. (2013). Negative emotional experiences arouse 
rumination and affect working memory capacity. Emotion, 13(5), 867-880. 
De Lissnyder, E., Koster, E. H., & De Raedt, R. (2012). Emotional interference in working 
memory is related to rumination. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 36(4), 348-357. 
De Vito, D., Al-Aidroos, N., & Fenske, M. J. (2017). Neural evidence that inhibition is linked to 
the affective devaluation of distractors that match the contents of working 
memory. Neuropsychologia, 99, 259-269. 
De Vito, D., Ferrey, A. E., Fenske, M. J., & Al-Aidroos, N. (2018). Cognitive-behavioral and 
electrophysiological evidence of the affective consequences of ignoring stimulus 
representations in working memory. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 18(3), 460-475. 
Delgado, M. R., Nearing, K. I., LeDoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. A. (2008). Neural circuitry 
underlying the regulation of conditioned fear and its relation to extinction. Neuron, 59(5), 
829-838. 
Diener, E., & Diener, C. (1996). Most people are happy. Psychological science, 7(3), 181-185. 
Diener, E., Larsen, R. J., Levine, S., & Emmons, R. A. (1985). Intensity and frequency: 
Dimensions underlying positive and negative affect. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 48(5), 1253-1265. 
 
84 
   
Dijkstra, K. A., van der Pligt, J., & van Kleef, G. A. (2017). Fit between decision mode and 
processing style predicts subjective value of chosen alternatives. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 47(1), 72-81. 
Drabek, T. E. (2012). Human system responses to disaster: An inventory of sociological findings. 
Springer Science & Business Media. 
Driscoll, R. L., De Launay, K. Q., & Fenske, M. J. (2018). Less approach, more avoidance: 
Response inhibition has motivational consequences for sexual stimuli that reflect changes 
in affective value not a lingering global brake on behavior. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 25(1), 463-471. 
Eich, E., Ng, J. T., Macaulay, D. P. A. D., Percy, A. D., & Grebneva, I. (2007). Combining 
music with thought to change mood. In J. A. Coan & J. J. Allen (Eds.), Handbook of 
emotion elicitation and assessment (pp. 124–136). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Elliot, A. J., Eder, A. B., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2013). Approach–avoidance motivation and 
emotion: Convergence and divergence. Emotion Review, 5(3), 308-311. 
Epp, A. M., Dobson, K. S., Dozois, D. J., & Frewen, P. A. (2012). A systematic meta-analysis of 
the Stroop task in depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 32(4), 316-328. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using 
G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 
41, 1149-1160. 
Fenske, M. J., & Eastwood, J. D. (2003). Modulation of focused attention by faces expressing 
emotion: evidence from flanker tasks. Emotion, 3(4), 327-343. 
 
85 
   
Fenske, M. J., & Raymond, J. E. (2006). Affective influences of selective attention. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6), 312-316. 
Fenske, M. J., Raymond, J. E., Kessler, K., Westoby, N., & Tipper, S. P. (2005). Attentional 
inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces. Psychological 
Science, 16(10), 753-758.  
Forgas, J. P., & Koch, A. S. (2013). Mood effects on cognition. In M. D. Robinson, E. Watkins, 
& E. Harmon-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (p. 231–251). Guilford 
Press. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 218-226. 
Fredrickson, B. L., & Branigan, C. (2005). Positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and 
thought‐action repertoires. Cognition & Emotion, 19(3), 313-332. 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference control 
functions: a latent-variable analysis. Journal of experimental psychology: 
General, 133(1), 101-135. 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2017). Unity and diversity of executive functions: Individual 
differences as a window on cognitive structure. Cortex, 86, 186-204. 
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Robinson, J. L., & Hewitt, J. K. (2011). Developmental trajectories 
in toddlers' self-restraint predict individual differences in executive functions 14 years 
later: A behavioral genetic analysis. Developmental Psychology, 47(5), 1410-1430. 
Gabel, M. S., & McAuley, T. (2018). Does mood help or hinder executive functions? Reactivity 
may be the key. Personality and Individual Differences, 128, 94-99. 
 
86 
   
Gabel, M. S., & McAuley, T. (2020). React to act: Negative mood, response inhibition, and the 
moderating role of emotional reactivity. Motivation and Emotion, 44(6), 862-869. 
Gable, P. A., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2010a). Late positive potential to appetitive stimuli and local 
attentional bias. Emotion, 10(3), 441-446. 
Gable, P., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2010b). The blues broaden, but the nasty narrows: Attentional 
consequences of negative affects low and high in motivational intensity. Psychological 
Science, 21(2), 211-215. 
Gable, P. A., Poole, B. D., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2015). Anger perceptually and conceptually 
narrows cognitive scope. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(1), 163-174. 
Ganguli, M., Snitz, B., Bilt, J. V., & Chang, C. C. H. (2009). How much do depressive 
symptoms affect cognition at the population level? The Monongahela–Youghiogheny 
Healthy Aging Team (MYHAT) study. International Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry, 24(11), 1277-1284. 
Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local 
processing of visual information. Psychological Science, 13(1), 34-40. 
Gasper, K., & Middlewood, B. L. (2014). Approaching novel thoughts: Understanding why 
elation and boredom promote associative thought more than distress and 
relaxation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 52, 50-57. 
Gasper, K., & Zawadzki, M. J. (2013). Want information? How mood and performance 
perceptions alter the perceived value of information and influence information-seeking 
behaviors. Motivation and Emotion, 37(2), 308-322. 
Goetz, T., Frenzel, A. C., Hall, N. C., Nett, U. E., Pekrun, R., & Lipnevich, A. A. (2014). Types 
of boredom: An experience sampling approach. Motivation and Emotion, 38(3), 401-419. 
 
87 
   
Goldstein, S., Naglieri, J. A., Princiotta, D., & Otero, T. M. (2014). Introduction: A history of 
executive functioning as a theoretical and clinical construct. In Handbook of executive 
functioning (pp. 3-12). Springer. 
Grahek, I., Everaert, J., Krebs, R. M., & Koster, E. H. (2018). Cognitive control in depression: 
Toward clinical models informed by cognitive neuroscience. Clinical Psychological 
Science, 6(4), 464-480. 
Gramszlo, C., & Woodruff-Borden, J. (2015). Emotional reactivity and executive control: A 
pathway of risk for the development of childhood worry. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 35, 35-41. 
Gray, J. A. (1970). The psychophysiological basis of introversion-extraversion. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 8(3), 249-266. 
Gary, J. A., & Mc Naughton, N. (2000). The neuropsychology of anxiety. Oxford Psychology 
Series, 33(4). 
Harmon-Jones, E. (2003). Anger and the behavioral approach system. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 35(5), 995-1005. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., Abramson, L., & Peterson, C. K. (2009). PANAS positive 
activation is associated with anger. Emotion, 9(2), 183–196.  
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., Amodio, D. M., & Gable, P. A. (2011). Attitudes toward 
emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(6), 1332-1350. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Price, T. F. (2013). What is approach 
motivation?. Emotion Review, 5(3), 291-295. 
 
88 
   
Harms, M. B., Zayas, V., Meltzoff, A. N., & Carlson, S. M. (2014). Stability of executive 
function and predictions to adaptive behavior from middle childhood to pre-
adolescence. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 331. 
Hayes, A. F. (2017). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. New York: Guilford. 
Howland, M., Armeli, S., Feinn, R., & Tennen, H. (2017). Daily emotional stress reactivity in 
emerging adulthood: temporal stability and its predictors. Anxiety, Stress, & 
Coping, 30(2), 121-132. 
Huizinga, M., Dolan, C. V., & van der Molen, M. W. (2006). Age-related change in executive 
function: Developmental trends and a latent variable analysis. Neuropsychologia, 44(11), 
2017-2036. 
Huntsinger, J. R., Clore, G. L., & Bar-Anan, Y. (2010). Mood and global–local focus: Priming a 
local focus reverses the link between mood and global–local processing. Emotion, 10(5), 
722-726. 
Huntsinger, J. R., Isbell, L. M., & Clore, G. L. (2014). The affective control of thought: 
Malleable, not fixed. Psychological Review, 121(4), 600-618. 
Isbell, L. M., Burns, K. C., & Haar, T. (2005). The role of affect on the search for global and 
specific target information. Social Cognition, 23(6), 529-552. 
Isbell, L. M., Lair, E. C., & Rovenpor, D. R. (2013). Affect‐as‐information about processing 
styles: A cognitive malleability approach. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 7(2), 93-114. 
 
89 
   
Isbell, L. M., Rovenpor, D. R., & Lair, E. C. (2016). The impact of negative emotions on self-
concept abstraction depends on accessible information processing styles. Emotion, 16(7), 
1040-1049. 
Isen, A. M. (1999). On the relationship between affect and creative problem solving. (pp 3-
17) Affect, creative experience, and psychological adjustment. 
Isen, A. M. (2000). Some perspectives on positive affect and self-regulation. Psychological 
Inquiry, 11(3), 184-187. 
Ji, L. J., Yap, S., Best, M. W., & McGeorge, K. (2019). Global processing makes people happier 
than local processing. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 670. 
John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2004). Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: Personality 
processes, individual differences, and life span development. Journal of 
Personality, 72(6), 1301-1334. 
Johnson, M. H. (2001). Functional brain development in humans. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
2(7), 475-483. 
Johnson, M. H. (2003). Development of human brain functions. Biological Psychiatry, 54(12), 
1312-1316. 
Joormann, J., Levens, S. M., & Gotlib, I. H. (2011). Sticky thoughts: Depression and rumination 
are associated with difficulties manipulating emotional material in working 
memory. Psychological Science, 22(8), 979-983. 
Jurado, M. B., & Rosselli, M. (2007). The elusive nature of executive functions: a review of our 
current understanding. Neuropsychology Review, 17(3), 213-233. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
 
90 
   
Kalanthroff, E., Cohen, N., & Henik, A. (2013). Stop feeling: Inhibition of emotional 
interference following stop-signal trials. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 78. 
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., Tuholski, S. W., Wilhelm, O., Payne, T. W., & Engle, R. W. 
(2004). The generality of working memory capacity: A latent-variable approach to verbal 
and visuospatial memory span and reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133(2), 189–217. 
Kimchi, R. (1992). Primacy of wholistic processing and global/local paradigm: A critical 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 24-38. 
Klauer, K. C., & Singmann, H. (2015). Does global and local vision have an impact on creative 
and analytic thought? Two failed replications. PloS one, 10(10). 
Koechlin, E. (2016). Prefrontal executive function and adaptive behavior in complex 
environments. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 37, 1-6. 
Koster, E. H., De Lissnyder, E., & De Raedt, R. (2013). Rumination is characterized by valence-
specific impairments in switching of attention. Acta Psychologica, 144(3), 563-570. 
Koster, E. H., De Raedt, R., Goeleven, E., Franck, E., & Crombez, G. (2005). Mood-congruent 
attentional bias in dysphoria: maintained attention to and impaired disengagement from 
negative information. Emotion, 5(4), 446-455. 
Krypotos, A. M., Arnaudova, I., Effting, M., Kindt, M., & Beckers, T. (2015). Effects of 
approach-avoidance training on the extinction and return of fear responses. PloS 
One, 10(7). 




   
 Larsen, R. J., & Ketelaar, T. (1991). Personality and susceptibility to positive and negative 
emotional states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(1), 132–140. 
Lench, H. C., Lench, H., & Ryan. (2018). Function of Emotions. (pp. 141-165) Springer.  
Logan, G. D., Cowan, W. B., & Davis, K. A. (1984). On the ability to inhibit simple and choice 
reaction time responses: a model and a method. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 10(2), 276-291. 
Lyubomirsky, S., Kasri, F. & Zehm, K. (2003) Dysphoric rumination impairs concentration on 
academic tasks. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 309–330. 
Mac Giollabhui, N., Swistun, D., Murray, S., Moriarity, D. P., Kautz, M. M., Ellman, L. M., 
Olino, T. M., Coe, C. L., Abramson, L. Y. & Alloy, L. B. (2020). Executive dysfunction 
in depression in adolescence: The role of inflammation and higher body 
mass. Psychological Medicine, 50(4), 683-691. 
Mackie, D. M., Asuncion, A. G., & Rosselli, F. (1992). The impact of affective states on 
persuasion processes. Review of personality and social psychology, 14, 247-270. 
Mackie, D. M., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Differential recall of subcategory information about in-
group and out-group members. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15(3), 401-
413. 
Macrae, C. N., & Lewis, H. L. (2002). Do I know you? Processing orientation and face 
recognition. Psychological Science, 13(2), 194-196. 
Majima, Y. (2015). The Effect of Induced Processing Orientation on a Holistic-Analytic 
Thinking Task. In EAPCogSci. 
Martin, E. A., & Kerns, J. G. (2011). The influence of positive mood on different aspects of 
cognitive control. Cognition and Emotion, 25(2), 265-279. 
 
92 
   
McKasy, M. (2020). A discrete emotion with discrete effects: Effects of anger on depth of 
information processing. Cognitive Processing, 1-19. 
McMillan, K. A., & Asmundson, G. J. (2016). PTSD, social anxiety disorder, and trauma: An 
examination of the influence of trauma type on comorbidity using a nationally 
representative sample. Psychiatry Research, 246, 561-567. 
McNaughton, N., & Gray, J. A. (2000). Anxiolytic action on the behavioural inhibition system 
implies multiple types of arousal contribute to anxiety. Journal of Affective 
Disorders, 61(3), 161-176. 
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 24(1), 167-202. 
Mitchell, R. L., & Phillips, L. H. (2007). The psychological, neurochemical and functional 
neuroanatomical mediators of the effects of positive and negative mood on executive 
functions. Neuropsychologia, 45(4), 617-629. 
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual differences in 
executive functions: Four general conclusions. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 21(1), 8-14. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. 
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex 
“frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49-100. 
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 134-140. 
Moons, W. G., & Shields, G. S. (2015). Anxiety, not anger, induces inflammatory activity: An 
avoidance/approach model of immune system activation. Emotion, 15(4), 463-476. 
 
93 
   
Munakata, Y., Snyder, H. R., & Chatham, C. H. (2012). Developing cognitive control: Three key 
transitions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(2), 71-77. 
Mundy, M. E. (2014). Testing day: The effects of processing bias induced by Navon stimuli on 
the strength of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Advances in cognitive psychology, 10(1), 9-14. 
Murray, B. D., Holland, A. C., & Kensinger, E. A. (2013). Episodic memory and emotion. In M. 
D. Robinson, E. Watkins, & E. Harmon-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and 
emotion (pp. 156–175). Guilford Press. 
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception. 
Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 353–383. 
Nelson, A. L., Purdon, C., Quigley, L., Carriere, J., & Smilek, D. (2015). Distinguishing the 
roles of trait and state anxiety on the nature of anxiety-related attentional biases to threat 
using a free viewing eye movement paradigm. Cognition and Emotion, 29(3), 504-526. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of 
depressive episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 569–582. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B. E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking 
rumination. Perspectives on psychological science, 3(5), 400-424. 
Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology: Views from 
cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy. Psychological 
Bulletin, 126(2), 220-246. 
Nock, M. K., Wedig, M. M., Holmberg, E. B., & Hooley, J. M. (2008). The emotion reactivity 
scale: Development, evaluation, and relation to self-injurious thoughts and behaviors. 
Behavior Therapy, 39(2), 107-116. 
 
94 
   
Oliva, A., & Torralba, A. (2006). Building the gist of a scene: The role of global image features 
in recognition. Progress in Brain Research, 155, 23-36. 
Olofsson, M. E., Wurm, M., & Boersma, K. (2016). Do responses to positive affect influence 
mood reactivity? Exploring cognitive response styles through a mood induction 
procedure. Nordic Psychology, 68(4), 220-232. 
Omer, H., & Alon, N. (1994). The continuity principle: A unified approach to disaster and 
trauma. American Journal of Community Psychology, 22(2), 273-287. 
Padmala, S., Bauer, A., & Pessoa, L. (2011). Negative emotion impairs conflict-driven executive 
control. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 192. 
Park, J., & Banaji, M. R. (2000). Mood and heuristics: the influence of happy and sad states on 
sensitivity and bias in stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(6), 
1005-1023. 
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned reflexes: an investigation of the physiological activity of the 
cerebral cortex. Oxford University Press. 
Perfect, T. J., Dennis, I., & Snell, A. (2007). The effects of local and global processing 
orientation on eyewitness identification performance. Memory, 15(7), 784-798. 
Pessoa, L. (2009). How do emotion and motivation direct executive control?. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 160-166. 
Pessoa, L., Padmala, S., Kenzer, A., & Bauer, A. (2012). Interactions between cognition and 
emotion during response inhibition. Emotion, 12(1), 192-197. 
Pine, D. S., Cohen, P., & Brook, J. S. (2001). Emotional reactivity and risk for psychopathology 
among adolescents. CNS Spectrums, 6(1), 27-35. 
 
95 
   
Pugliese, C. E., Anthony, L., Strang, J. F., Dudley, K., Wallace, G. L., & Kenworthy, L. (2015). 
Increasing adaptive behavior skill deficits from childhood to adolescence in autism 
spectrum disorder: Role of executive function. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 45(6), 1579-1587. 
Quigley, L., Nelson, A. L., Carriere, J., Smilek, D., & Purdon, C. (2012). The effects of trait and 
state anxiety on attention to emotional images: An eye-tracking study. Cognition & 
Emotion, 26(8), 1390-1411. 
Raymond, J. E., Fenske, M. J., & Westoby, N. (2005). Emotional devaluation of distracting 
patterns and faces: A consequence of attentional inhibition during visual search?. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(6), 1404-1415. 
Ripper, C. A., Boyes, M. E., Clarke, P. J., & Hasking, P. A. (2018). Emotional reactivity, 
intensity, and perseveration: Independent dimensions of trait affect and associations with 
depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms. Personality and Individual Differences, 121, 
93-99. 
Rock, P. L., Roiser, J. P., Riedel, W. J., & Blackwell, A. D. (2014). Cognitive impairment in 
depression: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychological Medicine, 44(10), 
2029-2040. 
Rodríguez-Gómez, P., Pozo, M. Á., Hinojosa, J. A., & Moreno, E. M. (2019). Please be logical, I 
am in a bad mood: An electrophysiological study of mood effects on 
reasoning. Neuropsychologia, 127, 19-28. 
Roskes, M., Elliot, A. J., Nijstad, B. A., & De Dreu, C. K. (2013). Time pressure undermines 
performance more under avoidance than approach motivation. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39(6), 803-813. 
 
96 
   
Rowe, G., Hirsh, J. B., & Anderson, A. K. (2007). Positive affect increases the breadth of 
attentional selection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(1), 383-388. 
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39(6), 1161-1178. 
Russell, J. A., & Barrett, L. F. (1999). Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other 
things called emotion: dissecting the elephant. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 76(5), 805-819. 
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological 
Review, 110(1), 145-172. 
Sacchi, S., Riva, P., & Aceto, A. (2016). Myopic about climate change: Cognitive style, 
psychological distance, and environmentalism. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 65, 68-73. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: 
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45(3), 513-523. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003). Mood as information: 20 years later. Psychological 
Inquiry, 14(3-4), 296-303. 
Schulz, K. P., Fan, J., Magidina, O., Marks, D. J., Hahn, B., & Halperin, J. M. (2007). Does the 
emotional go/no-go task really measure behavioral inhibition? Convergence with 
measures on a non-emotional analog. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 22(2), 151-
160. 
Seibert, P. S., & Ellis, H. C. (1991). Irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, and cognitive 
task performance. Memory & Cognition, 19(5), 507-513. 
 
97 
   
Shields, G. S., Moons, W. G., Tewell, C. A., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2016). The effect of negative 
affect on cognition: Anxiety, not anger, impairs executive function. Emotion, 16(6), 792-
797. 
Silvers, J. A., McRae, K., Gabrieli, J. D., Gross, J. J., Remy, K. A., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). 
Age-related differences in emotional reactivity, regulation, and rejection sensitivity in 
adolescence. Emotion, 12(6), 1235-1247. 
Simons, J. S., & Gaher, R. M. (2005). The Distress Tolerance Scale: Development and validation 
of a self-report measure. Motivation and Emotion, 29(2), 83-102. 
Skinner, B. F. (1935). Two types of conditioned reflex and a pseudo type. The Journal of 
General Psychology, 12(1), 66-77. 
Skinner, E. A., & Zimmer-Gembeck, M. J. (2007). The development of coping. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 58, 119-144. 
Smith, K. W., Balkwill, L. L., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2015). Syllogisms delivered in an 
angry voice lead to improved performance and engagement of a different neural system 
compared to neutral voice. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9, 273. 
Snyder, H. R. (2013). Major depressive disorder is associated with broad impairments on 
neuropsychological measures of executive function: a meta-analysis and 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 139(1), 81. 
Srinivasan, N., & Hanif, A. (2010). Global-happy and local-sad: Perceptual processing affects 
emotion identification. Cognition and Emotion, 24(6), 1062-1069. 
Ståhl, T., Van Laar, C., & Ellemers, N. (2012). The role of prevention focus under stereotype 
threat: Initial cognitive mobilization is followed by depletion. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 102(6), 1239-1251. 
 
98 
   
Stafford, L. D., Ng, W., Moore, R. A., & Bard, K. A. (2010). Bolder, happier, smarter: The role 
of extraversion in positive mood and cognition. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 48(7), 827-832. 
Sukhodolsky, D. G., Golub, A., & Cromwell, E. N. (2001). Development and validation of the 
anger rumination scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 31(5), 689-700. 
Tamir, M. (2005). Don't worry, be happy? Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and 
performance. Journal of personality and social psychology, 89(3), 449-461. 
Tamir, M., & Robinson, M. D. (2004). Knowing good from bad: the paradox of neuroticism, 
negative affect, and evaluative processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 87(6), 913-925. 
Tamir, M., Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). The epistemic benefits of trait-consistent 
mood states: An analysis of extraversion and mood. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 83(3), 663-677. 
Tamir, M., Schwartz, S. H., Oishi, S., & Kim, M. Y. (2017). The secret to happiness: Feeling 
good or feeling right?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(10), 1448-
1459. 
Tamir, M., Vishkin, A., & Gutentag, T. (2020). Emotion regulation is motivated. Emotion, 20(1), 
115-119. 
Thake, J., & Zelenski, J. M. (2013). Neuroticism, BIS, and reactivity to discrete negative mood 
inductions. Personality and Individual Differences, 54(2), 208-213. 
Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: The 
effects of specific emotions on information processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(6), 973-988. 
 
99 
   
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131. 
Valentine, P. V., & Smith, T. E. (2002). Finding something to do: The disaster continuity care 
model. Brief Treatment & Crisis Intervention, 2(2) 183-196. 
Verbruggen, F., & De Houwer, J. (2007). Do emotional stimuli interfere with response 
inhibition? Evidence from the stop signal paradigm. Cognition and Emotion, 21(2), 391-
403. 
Von Hippel, W., & Gonsalkorale, K. (2005). “That is bloody revolting!” Inhibitory control of 
thoughts better left unsaid. Psychological Science, 16(7), 497-500. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
Wei, M., Vogel, D. L., Ku, T. Y., & Zakalik, R. A. (2005). Adult attachment, affect regulation, 
negative mood, and interpersonal problems: The mediating roles of emotional reactivity 
and emotional cutoff. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(1), 14-24. 
Wheeler, R. E., Davidson, R. J., & Tomarken, A. J. (1993). Frontal brain asymmetry and 
emotional reactivity: A biological substrate of affective style. Psychophysiology, 30(1), 
82-89. 
Wiebe, S. A., Espy, K. A., & Charak, D. (2008). Using confirmatory factor analysis to 
understand executive control in preschool children: I. Latent structure. Developmental 
Psychology, 44(2), 575-587. 
Xu, M., Rowe, K., & Purdon, C. (2020). Examining the Impact of a Single Session of Mountain 
Meditation on Attentional Scope. Journal of Cognitive Enhancement, 4(2), 155-166. 
 
100 
   
Yik, M., Russell, J. A., & Steiger, J. H. (2011). A 12-point circumplex structure of core 
affect. Emotion, 11(4), 705-731. 
Zelazo, P. D., & Frye, D. (1998). Cognitive complexity and control: II. The development of 
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